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The 1972 report by the House Armed Services Special Subcom-
mittee on disciplinary problems in the U» S. Navy recommended
that " • • • naval leadership, the chain of command, and harmoni-
ous interpersonal relations must be strengthened," [Refo 32,
p. 17672] Subsequent to, but not necessarily as a result of,
the subcommittee's report, the CNO promulgated the Navy Human
Goals Plan which is o • • designed to ensure the development
of the full potential of the Navy's human resources and the
application of that potential toward maximum effectiveness in
the performance of the Navy's primary mission." [Ref . 14? p« 1]
As proposed, the Human Goals Plan consists of five major programs,
one of which is the Human Resources Management Program. The
objective of the Human Resources Management Program at the unit
command level is " • • o to create a new initiative to and (sic)
cope with contemporary problems in a changing environment by
utilizing current theories and academic findings within the
traditional Navy structure. It focuses on the development of
leadership skills in the functions of planning, decision making,
communications, awareness, problem identification and solution,
and conflict management." [Ref. 14, p. B-2] The Human Resources
Management Program is designed to be implemented within the
operating forces of the Navy through Human Resources Management
Centers and Detachments (HRMC/D).
g

The Human Resources Management Program is sub-divided into
four major areas: one of which is Organizational Development
and Management. This portion of the Human Resources Management
Program " • • • provides commands with assistance of trained
specialists in organizational development to assist a command
in increasing the overall performance of its personnel towards
mission attainment and overall command excellence." [Ref. 14,
p. B-3] Thus the U. S. Navy has become a practitioner of
organization development.
B. OBJECTIVE AND ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
The purpose of this thesis is not to evaluate the merits
of using organization development in the Navy. Its objective
is to evaluate the technology presently employed by comparing
an actual case with the literature in the field. Based on this
comparison recommendations for improving the technology are
proposedo Its secondary purpose is to provide an actual case
study for possible classroom use at the Naval Postgraduate School.
There are many different strategies and models which collec-
tively may be called organization development (OD). However,
common to most OD strategies is a sequence of events or phases.
These phases constitute the technology of OD and can be classified
as: 1) Entry, 2) Data Collection, 3) Diagnosis, 4) Data Feedback,
5) Action, 6) Evaluation and 7) Withdrawal. All but the last
two phases will be discussed. Section II will discuss the history
and technology of OD in conventional literature. Section III
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will address the history and technology of OD in the U. S. Navy.
Section IV is a case study of an OD effort conducted by
HRMC/D aboard a U. S. Navy ship. Section V analyzes the
specific case utilizing the information provided in the preceding
sections. Section VI draws upon the case analysis to make some
general conclusions regarding OD technology in the U. S. Navy.
It has been the author's experience that very few members
of the Naval Postgraduate School faculty are sufficiently familiar
with the Navy's OD effort. Therefore, the case study has been
designed so that it could be utilized as a classroom device
thereby providing the student with an account of an actual OD
intervention in the naval environment. The survey printout has
been provided for two reasons. First, to familiarize the student
with the form of the survey results. Secondly, for the ambitious
who may desire to further diagnose the problems of this specific
ship
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To collect the data for the case study, the author was a
"participant as observer" in the sense that Phillips uses the
term. [Ref. 26, p. 168] The author revealed his role as a student
doing research. The author did not, however, actively take part
in the OD effort. The author did utilize unstructured interviews
with members of both the client organization and the consultant
team The author was present for the HRAV planning session on
21 June and throughout the five day HRAV. The case was
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developed from these observations, interviews, and the consultant's
notes concerning the intervention.
II. SURVEY OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT LITERATURE
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a synopsis of
the important literature relevant to the U. S. Navy's organization
development (OD) effort. It is against this backdrop of expert
knowledge that the case in section IV will be analyzed. The
chapter contains two main sections. The first discusses the
origin, definition and objectives of organization development
and provides additional background information about the field.
The second section contains a more detailed discussion of the
technology employed in OD.
B. BACKGROUND
!• OD in Historical Perspective
To place organization development in its historical
perspective it is useful to briefly review the development of
organization theory. Throughout the ages there has been a con-
siderable amount of effort concentrated on identifying the factors
which contribute to an effective organization. The emphasis of
the early works was primarily on the organization of the society
and the state. Plato's REPUBLIC serves as a good example of this
type of work. However, at the turn of the 19th century this
effort began to center on smaller organizational entities. This
11

shift of emphasis is not too difficult to comprehend since the
world was experiencing the effects of the industrial revolution
which resulted in a tremendous growth in the number of small
economic organizations » It was at this time that businessmen,
administrators, scholars, and agency heads began to think about
organizations in a systematic and scientific manner.
From the beginning of the 20th century to the outbreak
of the Second World War there emerged an assortment of studies
and writings which collectively are known in most management
textbooks as the classical or traditional school of management.
These writers were seeking answers to fundamental questions
about the management of work and the management of organizations.
For the most part, they were practitioners and engineers by
vocation. Their implicit assumption about man was that he was
driven by his desire for economic betterment. These writings
could also be characterized by the lack of imperical data to
substantiate their propositions. The giants of this era were
men like Taylor (1911), Fayol (1925), Mooney (1925), Urwick (1937),
and Gilbreth (1911). In their studies, these men were looking
for the principles which could be applied for the "one best way"
to run an effective and efficient organization.
Most of the writers of the classical school did not con-
sider the human aspects of the organization. Two notable excep-
tions however were Follet (1940) and Benard (193&) who could be
considered forerunners of the next major classification of
writings: the human relations school o This school came to the
12

forefront principally as a result of the world-wide publicity
of Roethlisberger's and Dickson's studies (1939) of the Hawthorne
division of the General Electric Company. The chief contributors
of this school were: Mayo (1944), Lewin (1947), McGregor (1947),
and Lippitt (195$). Their writings prevailed in the management
literature during the forties and through the fifties. In con-
trast to the proponents of the classical school, most of the
writers in the human relations school were educators. Again,
this school was looking for the "one best way" to structure
and operate an effective organization. The thrust of their
message was participative management.
In the early to mid-sixties two major movements emerged
and dominated most of the management literature of that decade.
Both movements treated organizations as systems. During this
period, writers concerned with the theory of organizations began
to view the organization as a system of mutually interdependent
parts linked together for a common purpose. They viewed the
organization much the way the biologists and people in the field
of electrical engineering viewed the objects of their studies.
William Scott labels this concept of organization as the modern
theory and states that it is characterized by attempting to
fully integrate the disciplines of the social and physical sciences
[Refo 28]
The second movement in the decade of the sixties has come
to be known as Organization Development (0D) o Mark A. Frohman
and S. Sashkin imply that the works of the classical and human
13

relations theorists concentrated on a concern for stability and
certainty. They additionally and rightfully cite the work of
Max Weber (1947) as characteristic of this concern. In writing
about organization development, they contrast this concern by
stating " o . . this new field (organization development)
represents a concern for change, innovation, challenge and
development in organization functioning." [Ref. 19, p. 2] They
continue by stating:
This shift of emphasis from stability to change and
innovation, is not really surprising f- It is simply a
reflection of the incredible rate of change that society
as a whole has experienced over the past hundred years,
and of the continuous increase in this rate. As a
result, while for over seventy years the focus was on
establishing stable internal structure and functioning
of organizations, this focus is now one way of keeping
pace with changes in the society outside the organization
and facilitating changes in patterns of organizational
structure and functioning o
Thus, societal change produces pressures for organiza-
tional change, and has created a boom in the field of
0. D.
[Refo 19, p. 2]
2. Need for 0D
Most of the literature which discusses the origins of
organization development is adamant about the fact that the "times
of the day," that is the rapid changes in values, technology and
society in general, have created a situation in which our tradi-
tional bureaucratic organizations are ill equipped to cope with.
The following statement by Bennis not only substantiates what
Frohman and Sashkin expressed but also gives the flavor of the
enthusiasm generally expressed by the writers in the field:
14

Neither behavioral scientists nor their theories
created the need for organization development. They
helped, of course, but there should be no doubt that
Alfred P. Sloan put his finger on the real cause:
CHANGE. Our social institutions cannot withstand,
let alone cope with, the devastating rate of change
without fundamental alterations in the way they nego-
tiate their environments and the way they conduct the
main operations of their enterprise c Organization
development is not something that is 'nice' to have
around, like a shiny new gadget, or because its value
system resembles our Judaic Christian ethic. ORGANI-
ZATION DEVELOPMENT IS NECESSARY WHENEVER OUR SOCIAL
INSTITUTIONS COMPETE FOR SURVIVAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF
CHRONIC CHANGE.
[Ref. 7, p. IS]
3« Origins of OP
Organization development can trace its origins to the
time frame of the human relations era. During that period,
there were two categories of research activity which later
formed the building blocks for organization development.
Sensitivity-training or laboratory-training as it is sometimes
called was one of the areas o The other area was known as survey
research and feedback, now commonly referred to as survey-feed-
back. This orservation is substantiated by French and Bell in
their discussion of the history of organization development:
We see systematic organization development activities
as having a recent history, and to use an analogy with a
tree, as having at least two important trunk stems. One
stem consists of innovations in the application of labora-
tory-training insights to organizations. A second major
stem is survey research and feedback methodology.
[Ref. 15, p. 21]
Because of the historical importance of these two areas,
it is helpful to take a closer but at the same time cursory glance
into the origins and definitions of survey-feedback and sensitivity
trainingo Survey-feedback, as it is known today, had its
15

beginnings at the Institute for Social Research, University of
Michigan, It was pioneered at the institute by Floyd C. Mann,
H. Baumgartel and Rensis Likert during the mid-fifties. Sub-
sequently, F. Wo Neff, and D, G. Bowers have done a considerable
amount of writing in the area. Miles et al gives a good concise
explanation of survey-feedback:
Survey feedback is a process in which outside staff
and members of the organization collaboratively gather,
analyze and interpret data that deal with various aspects
of the organization's functioning and its members' work
lives, and using the data as a base, begin to correctively
alter the organizational structure and the members* work
relationship.
[Ref. 24, p. 453]
In its purest form, the data are fed back to the organi-
zation in an "interlocking chain of conferences." [Ref. 23,
p. 609] In this process a member receives the feedback from
his superior and then he in turn feeds it down the line to his
subordinates. Baumgartel adds an additional insight to the
process which is worthy of note. He states that ... it deals
with each manager, supervisor, and employee in the context of
his own job, his own problems and his own work relationships."
[Ref. 4, p. 5]
In contrast, sensitivity training concentrates on indi-
vidual self-awareness and personal growth in unstructured small-
group situations. French and Bell have traced the origins of
sensitivity training to a workshop held in the summer of 1946.
"This workshop was sponsored by the Connecticut Interracial
Commission and the Research Center for Group Dynamics, then at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology." [Ref. 15, p. 21]
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Bennis sheds further insight into the process by stating:
"Laboratory-training, • • • takes man's emotional life as its
central issue and seeks to determine how these emotions affect
his relationships with others and his capacity for attaining
high competence. It focuses on life experiences that ordinarily
are bypassed or ignored; man's affective regions." [Ref. 7, p. 62]
Key figures in the development of sensitivity training
were: Benne, Bennis, Lewin, Lippitt, McGregor, Sheppard, and
Blake, In the late fifties Sheppard and McGregor were instru-
mental in applying the process to complex organizations for the
purpose of increasing their effectiveness. Also of particular
note was Kurt Lewin 's theory of adult learning. The underlying
philosophy of this theory is that learning takes place only
after a person has been "unfrozen," that is, the individual
feels safe to let go of some previously learned patterns and
behaviors and thereby becomes willing to examine alternative
ideas, approaches, and behaviors. (Lewin's theory is: unfreeze -
learn new - refreeze.)
Sensitivity training was also the principle source of
what is now known as process consultation which is an important
ingredient in organization development. • • most of the
assumptions which P-C (process consultation) makes in relation
to working with an organization are derived of assumptions which
"trainers" make in working with laboratory-training groups."
[Ref. 27, Po 12] In Schein's words Process Consultation • • •
is a set of activities on the part of the consultant which help
17

the client to perceive, understand, and act upon process events
which occur in the client's environment." [Ref. 27, p» 9]
4, OD's Model of an Organization
The assumptions, theories and findings resulting from
the pioneering work in both survey-feedback and sensitivity
training formed the basis of organization development.' However,
the writings of Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) on organization theory
have also had an important impact on the formation of organization
development o They viewed organizations as systems in the same
way as Scott's modern organizational theorists propose. More
specifically, they viewed the organization as one which consisted
of individuals possessing predispositions based on their own
past personal experiences „ In order for the organization to cope
with the environment, the individual is given a specialized
task (differentiation) which in turn creates the need for
coordination (integration). "At the most general level, it is
a systems approach to the study of organizations. Within this
general framework is the notion of an organization as a system
of differentiated units which require integration, and the view
of the individual contributor as a complex problem-solving system
himself." [Refo 21, p c 3]
5. Definition and Objectives of OP
Having briefly discussed the origins of organization
development, it is convenient at this point to propose a definition,
It must be pointed out that because of its youth there is no one
universal definition. French and Bell offer a very comprehensive
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one, [Ref. 15, p. 15] » however, this author prefers that proposed
by Mark A c Frohman:
Operationally, organization development is a planned
effort to improve the functioning and effectiveness of
an entire system through applications of behavioral
science knowledge to the processes and structures of the
systeirio •
[Refc 19, p- 3]
Several authors have expressed the objectives of organi-
zation development. A small sampling of those expressions will
convey the main thrust: "to create a self-renewing organization,"
[Ref, 11, p. xi], "to change the organization from its current
state to a better developed state," [Ref. 21, p. 4], "to increase
organization health and effectiveness." [Ref. 5, p. 25] Blake
and Mouton provide an added dimension by emphasizing that the
culture, climate and personality of the organization plays a
major role in its effectiveness. "No matter how competent a
man may be, the culture of his situation is a significant factor
in determining whether or not he is able to apply his competence."
[Ref. 8, p. 112]
6. More of an Art than a Science
Although based on the scientific methods employed in
behavioral research methodology, the practice of organization
development is more of an art than a science. "Despite the
common occurrence of organizational change, its dynamics and'
underlying processes are understood in only rough, ill-defined
ways." [Ref. 3, p« 79] Frohman and Sashkin conclude that
"much more research and knowledge is required before organization
development becomes less of an art and more of a science 6 "
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[Ref. 19 j P» 54] Therefore, it should not be concluded from
the fact that organization development has been successful on
many occasions that the reasons for success are known or, more
importantly, understood. However, Greiner has identified the
following general factors which he has found to be common to most
successful efforts:
There is pressure on the top management which induces
some arousal to action.
There is some form of intervention at the top, either
a new member of the organization, or a consultant, or a
new staff head in organization-development. This induces
some reorientation in looking at internal problems.
There is a diagnosis of the problem areas and this
induces an analysis of specific problems.
There is an invention of some new solutions to" problems
and this ^reduces some commitment to new courses of action.
There is some experimentation with new solutions and
this produces a search for results with the experiments.
There is reinforcement in the system from positive
results and this produces acceptance of the new practices.
[Ref. 16, p. 126-129]
7. The Change Agent
A distinguishing characteristic of organization development
is its use of a "change agent." The change agent is usually
external to the organization and has been trained in the broad
area of social psychology but more specifically in organizational
psychology. He has attained the skill to apply organizational
development strategies and models to an on-going organization.
... the primary responsibility of this role is to facilitate
the improvement of organization effectiveness and health through
20

providing interventions, development activities, and programs
for organization improvement." [Ref. 5> p« 20]
C. OD TECHNOLOGY
The technology of organization development consists of many-
models and strategies, A partial list would include: Managerial
Grid, Team Building, Techno-structural, Survey-feedback, Sensi-
tivity Training, and Conflict Management French. and Bell give
a comprehensive overview of these and others and provides useful
classification schemes for the strategies. [Ref. 15, p« 97-146]
In "contrast, entire books have been dedicated solely to one
strategy. It is not within the scope of this introductory section
to deal with any particular strategy in depth. However, there
are distinct phases which most strategies have in common.
Most of the organization development programs named above
will consist of the following steps or phases:
ENTRY into the organization by a consultant (change agent)
Collection of organizational data (DATA COLLECTION)
DIAGNOSIS of data
Feeding back of data (DATA FEEDBACK)
A therapeutic or ACTION phase
An EVALUATION of the effort
WITHDRAWAL of the consultant from the organization.
The discussion that follows and the case analysis will address





Conventionally, consultants have been utilized by
organizations to 1) purchase information about its internal
organization or its environment, 2) purchase a service, 3) assess
their present state and to prescribe solutions to problems which
might surface, Schein categorizes the first two uses as the
"Purchase Model" and the third as the "Doctor-Patient Model."
[Refo 27, p. 5-6] However, in organization development the
role of the consultant does not fall into either of these models.
In line with the earlier stated objectives of organization
development and as the name "change agent" implies, the organi-
zation development consultant seeks to bring about change o Based
on Lewin's (1951) force-field theory, it is now generally acknowl-
edged that human beings will resist change. Lawrence comments
that it can be concluded from the study by Coch and French that
resistance to change can be overcome by getting the people that
are subject to the change to participate in making it. But
Lawrence cautions that participation is not something that can
be conjured up or created artificially. "Participation, to be
of value, must be based on a search for ideas that are seen as
truly relevant to the change under consideration." [Ref. 20, p. 6]
Accordingly, a key element in any organization
development program is that the client and consultant achieve a
relationship that will promote the client's full and earnest
participation in the change effort. The building of this critical
22

relationship commences with the initial contact which begins the
entry phase. So critical is this relationship to the success
of the effort that, . » • the problems that inhere in that
relationship are probably symptomatic of the problems to be
enchant ered." [Ref. 7, p» 46] This becomes a pivotal statement
for understanding the case in section IV,
In addition to the relationship promoting participa-
tion it should also be characterized by an open and honest exchange
of information with respect to perceptions and expectations by
both the client and consultant. This requirement is important
because as the program unfolds the client may be confronted with
issues dealing in these areaso In particular, problems might
be identified which could be explained, caused or effected by
individual or group perceptions and expectations. Therefore,
both the client and consultant must be ready to deal with these
issues in an open and confronting manner.
The relationship should also be open and honest from
the standpoint that each should understand the motivation of the
other. It should not be characterized by subleties and hidden
agenda items. On the contrary all desires, expectations, and
thoughts should be made explicit In this way, a climate which
promotes effective problem solving can be obtained and will be
required to be sustained throughout the effort.
Mutual trust and confidence should also be a charac-
teristic of the client-consultant relationship. Trust from the
standpoint that the members of the organization should not see
23

the consultant as a spy carrying out a pet project of the boss
or that they are being manipulated. Also from the standpoint
that the client can trust the ethics of the consultant. The
client must also be confident that the consultant is competent
in his fieldo
In order to fulfill the above characteristics, the
relationship should not be one of subordinate-superior or teacher
pupil, but rather one which is collaborative (power-equal),'
Webster^s Dictionary defines collaborate as "to work together;
especially in reference to literary, artistic or scientific
work." Throughout the literature, collaborative is the word
which is most used to describe the client-consultant relation-
ship in organization development,
b. Preconditions
In order to fully participate, the client, be it
the individual or the organization, must be "ready,." If the
client has the notion that organization development carries
with it some mystique, this should be dispelled. He should have
no fears about what organization development is, what its
objectives are and generally by what means these objectives are
attained. If the client is knowledgeable about organization
development, he is more prone to be "ready," If on the other
hand he lacks knowledge in the area he is very likely to react
defensively thus preventing him from fully participating.' C.
Brooklyn Derr experienced this latter reaction in his work in
a large city school system. As a result of his experience in
24

that setting, -he describes an entry strategy for school systems
which includes a two-day entry workshop, " • • • a brief
organization development kind of experience, such as the entry
workshop, may be needed to help the client organization to really
understand the OD method so that they can use it successfully
for organizational change." [Ref. 12, p. 51]
Another aspect of readiness is expressed by Bennis
when he discusses the cultural state of the client. He points
out that "each client system transmits and maintains a system
of values that permeates the organization and is used as a
basis for action and commitment." [Ref. 7, p. 45] He concludes
that if these values are too much at odds with the values of
the. OD consultant, then the OD effort should be avoided,. In
his discussion, he elaborates on some cultural variables which
are important Of particular note, and of relevance to the
practice of OD in the Navy, is his statement regarding the con-
trol and authority system employed by the client. "If it is
too rigid and authoritarian, it may be too much at variance with
the values of organization development .""[Ref • 7, p. 45] Assessing
the cultural readiness of the client system is a subjective
process. However, "one of the best ways of diagnosing the cul-
tural readiness has to do with the way the client system reacts
to and establishes a relationship with the change agent." [Ref. 7,
p. 47]
A further aspect of organizational readiness addresses
the clients felt need for change. "Unless the client is experi-
encing some 'pain' which drives him to- seek the appropriate
25

help, then the consultant cannot be of much assistance,," [Ref •
13 y p. 15] Most authors argue that there must be a strong pressure
for improvement from both inside and outside the organization.
According to Greiner, this is one of the distinguishing charac-
teristics of successful change efforts. [Ref. 16, 126] On the
other hand, French and Bell have expressed the view that the
important element that should be present is a sense that things
could be bettero Accordingly, they propose that OD can play an
important "tune-up" role for an organization* [Ref. 15, p. 14$]
The literature reviewed conveys the thought that the client seeks
help from the consultant. It is not the consultant who initiates
the first action. This implies that the client, for some reason,
feels that he has a problem that the consultant can help him with.
Whether he is feeling pain or just feels that things could be
better is a matter of degree. The important point is that the
client feels a need and seeks help.* The basic underlying assumption
of the above statements is the theory that motivation to change is
created by a realization that the present state differs from the
desired state.
c. Contract
An objective of the entry phase is the establishment
of a mutually agreeable contract. "In 0. D. consulting, the con-
tract is central to success or failure." [Ref. 31, p. 1] In
discussing what he means by contract, Weisbord states: "I mean
an explicit exchange of expectations, part dialogue, part written




What each -expects to get from the relationship;
How much time each will invest, when, and at what cost;
The ground rules under which the parties will operate.
[Ref. 31, p. 1]
Most authors refer to the contract as containing two main aspects,
The first has to do with the commitment, motivation and collabora-
tion of the client. This aspect is referred to as the psycho-
logical contract. The second aspect of the contract is called
the content portion. This aspect deals mainly with the ground
rules such as when, where, and how meetings will be conducted.
Weisbord is quick to point out that contracting is
a continuous and iterative process o Although it commences
during the entry phase it continues throughout the entire OD
program. "Contracting like the seasons, is repetitive and con-
tinually renewable." [Ref. 31, Po 2]
From a practitioners point of view the following
list of questions might be considered as the contract solidifies:
What are your various roles in this relationship?
How and when will you collaborate?
Who is your contact person with the system?
How should you be introduced?
How, when and where will you collect data?
How will you work together (behavioral norms)?
What are your/the client's ethics for this work?
*Class notes of C. Brooklyn Derr,
27

do Point of Entry
Argyris believes that change can only take place if
it starts at the top and then percolates down, [Refo 2, p. 27&]
Beer and Muse have found that "change can and does begin at
lower levels in the organization." [Refo 6, p. 99] However they
say that "what is necessary is that someone in a strategic posi-
tion feel the need for change and improvement " [Ref. 6, p. £2]
Bennis states that "organization development programs can begin
anywhere so long as there is some kind of 'umbrella' protection
from the next highest echelon and so long as the other systems
that relate to the client are aware of, if not committed to,
the goals of the organization development program " [Refo 7,
p. 57] In summary, although there is not consensus within the
literature, it is probably safe to conclude that for an OD
effort to be successful it "does not necessarily need to start
at the top, although this is the ideal circumstance." [Ref, 15,
p. 148]
e o Summary
From the above discussion it can be concluded that
"entry is of primary importance to the whole OD processe" [Ref.
13, p« 14] It is during this phase that the preconditions,
which have been found to be necessary, are assessed. This assess-
ment can only be made subjectively and perhaps only sensed
through the relationship between the client and consultant. The
client and consultant should build an open, honest, trusting
and collaborative relationship. This relationship is critical
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to the success of the OD effort. This relationship is necessary
so that the client can fully participate in the change effort.
To express it in a different manner, "the system involved in
change must be the source, target and agent of change." [Ref.
19 > P» 54] The entry phase culminates in a contract which is
mutually agreeable to both parties. The relationship-building
and contracting is a continuous and iterative process that con-
tinues throughout the entire OD effort. Although there is not
consensus on the point, it is generally considered ideal if
entry could take place at the top of the organization.
2. Data Collection
The methods of data collection for OD are the same as
for the social sciences in generals However; a difference does
exist in the manner in which the client or subject is involved
with the collection and uses of the data. Argyris labels the
traditional social research methodology as "mechanistic" and
the method used in organization development as "organic." [Ref.
1, p 104]
Traditional or mechanistic social research has relied
on a researcher-subject relationship. In such a relationship
the researcher is viewed by the subject as an expert and often
a boss-subordinate relationship results. Traditional research
stresses the non-involvement of the subject with the researcher
for fear that the subject will contaminate the data The fact
that the findings of social research can be proven to be statis-
tically valid does not necessarily mean that this type of
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relationship-, itself, has not invalidated the findings. In
fact, most books and courses on traditional social research
warn the novice researcher of the social desireability or
demand effect which can influence a subject's response. This .
view of the subject also effects the manner in which the findings
are fed back. In this process the researcher usually assumes
the role of an expert and does not actively involve the subject.
In contrast, OD follows a research model which is
referred to as action-researcho It is characterized by the full
involvement of the subject in both the collection and feeding
back of the data. The subject is viewed as the user of this
information and as such will ultimately be responsible for
how it effects his systemo This model also involves both
researcher and client in what is called the action phase. This
phase implements the findings of the research. To carry the
model to its completion requires both parties to evaluate the
effects of the implementation by again collecting data. There-
fore it is an iterative process which occurs until withdrawal
of the consultant. French and Bell provide an interesting diagram
which graphically displays this process. [Ref. 15, p« 86]
3. Diagnosis
The objective of the data collection phase was to collect
data about the present state of the organization. The objective
of the diagnosis phase is to interpret this data in order to find
out what the present state is. Based on the diagnosis, the
direction of the change effort can then be determined. Bowers
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and Franklin state that "a successful change effort begins with
rigorous measurement of the way in which the organization
presently is functioning. These measurements provide the material
for a diagnosis, and the diagnosis forms the basis for the design
of a program of change activities." [Ref. 10, p. 45] They con-
tinue by stating the reasons for the importance of the diagnostic
step: "It will increase the probability of focusing upon the
right, not the wrong, course of treatments being prescribed."
[Ref. 10, p. 46] The diagnosis of the present state of an
organization is also useful as a reference for evaluating the
results of the change effort.
The diagnosis usually focuses on two aspects of the
organization; the structure and the processes.* The structural
approach stresses the diagnosis of subsystems within the organi-
zation in an attempt to identify problems at certain levels
within the system. The process approach emphasizes the organi-
zational processes which permeate all levels. The OD consultant
will need to integrate the two approaches in order to accomplish
an accurate and meaningful diagnosis. "From a diagnosis of these
systems and processes, ... a strategy for change emerges."
[Refc 5, p. 27]
4. Data Feedback
Lawrence and Lorsch contend that the manner in which the
data are presented and interpreted to the members of the organi-
zation is generally accomplished in one of two ways.
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First, the raw data are discussed with top manage-
ment, who are asked to make the diagnosis within their
own framework; or second, the change agent may present
his own diagnosis without making his model for analyzing
organizational behavior explicit. The problem with the
first approach is that management is limited by its own
framework and it tends to see each problem separately,
failing at times to recognize the interrelationship be-
tween problems and what may lie behind them. The second
approach has inherent in it the problems of communication
in getting management to see why the change agent sees
the problems the way he does,
[Ref. 22, p 470]
Therefore, the objective of the data feedback phase is
not merely to present the diagnosis to the client nor is it to
have the client diagnose the data himself. The key issue in
this phase is for the client to fully participate and to be
genuinely involved with the data and its meanings For this to
occur, there must exist a relationship between the client and
consultant that will foster a mutual and collaborative' effort.
The importance of this relationship was discussed in the section
on entry. This relationship should result in an open and con-
fronting climate which will allow the client to question, test
and attack the data to the point where he develops a "firm belief
in its worthiness. In essence, the feedback phase should result
in a joint diagnosis which the client perceives as meaningful
and relevant; one which he is able to accept and internalize.
Accomplishing this allows the client and consultant to plan a
course of action to correct the perceived discrepancies.
The fact that change can be initiated by feedback itself
is concisely stated by French and Bell in their discussion of
feedback as an intervention or strategy:
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Feedback: This refers to learning new data about
oneself, others, group processes, or organizational
dynamics - data that one did not previously take active
account of. Feedback refers to activities and processes
that 'reflect' or 'mirror' an objective picture of the
real world. Awareness of the 'new information' may lead
to change if the feedback is not too threatening.
[Ref. 15, Po 108]
Therefore, not only is feedback a necessary prerequisite for
the action phase, it, in and of itself, could be considered as
part of the action step. This is an important ingredient in
the Navy's 0D program,
: « 5 • Action
The content of the action phase is dependent upon the
diagnosis of the system's present state in relation to its
desired state, "The action which is taken cannot be separated
from the diagnosis made*" [Ref, 22, p c 470] To describe in
detail the full range of activities that could comprise this
phase is beyond the scope of this thesis. The reader is referred
to French and Bell (pp c 97-146) for a concise overview of the
most widely used techniques. The Navy's OD interventions and
related action phase is based primarily on the survey feedback
method. It is to this area that the action phase discussion
will be confinedo
An authoritative volume on survey feedback does not
presently exist, however there are a number of articles written
about the method. In one such article, Floyd Co Mann describes
his pioneering study in the area. In this study, it was found
that more significant positive changes occurred in employee
attitudes and perceptions in four experimental groups using
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survey feedback than in the two control groups which did not
feed back the survey results. [Ref. 23, p. 6ll] David G. Bowers,
of the Institute for Social Research, outlines the comprehensive
study, known as the Michigan ICL study, which utilized 17,000 .
respondents in 23 organizations. This study indicates that when
compared with four different strategies, survey feedback was
associated with the most significant frequency of improvement.
The study compared the following strategies: survey feedback,
interpersonal process consultation, task process consultation,
and laboratory training. [Refo 9, p° 21]
In another article, Bowers and Franklin describe the
two main underlying assumptions associated with this method.
First, the difference between perceptions is motivation.
Secondly, behavior is goal-seeking or goal-oriented and feed-
back is necessary in order to discern the distance from the
goal. [Ref. 10, p. 49]
In yet another article by Bowers, the rationale of the
survey portion of the method is described.
Survey feedback starts from a point of the presentation
of tabulated data obtained from responses to a paper-and
pencil questionnaire. The nature of the items in the
questionnaire leads to those responses representing a
summarization, in each respondent's mind, of behavior
or conditions as they have existed 'on the average' over
some previous period of time * Because it combines many
responses, from each of many individuals, the information •
is rather highly reliable. Because most of these indivi-
duals have experienced the behavior or condition first
hand for a long period of time, they know it well, and
their responses are presumably reasonably valid. The
use of a standard questionnaire instrument, developed
with technical care, enhances these two conditions. It
also results, however, in the omission from consideration
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of events- and characteristics which are either rare, or
unique to the group, individual, or organization in question,
^Informal investigations conducted in the early years
of ICLS indicate that most respondents take six months to
a year into account in arriving at their response.
[Refo IB, p 12]
The feedback portion is uniquely summarized by Miles,
Horstein, et al:
Often, though not always, the data are shown first to
the 'head' of the family group, at which point his pre-
sentation of the data to the rest of the group may be
discussed or rehearsed. Then the data are presented to
the rest of the group, who are, in fact, 'heads' of other
family groups. Subsequently, they will examine the data
with their groups. Thus, the survey feedback takes place
through an interlocking set of conferences. Typically,
outside staff members are present at each of the
conferences.
Ordinarily, examination of the data leads to action
planning in response to problems made salient by the
data. Consequently, these feedback conferences provide
clients the opportunity to engage in problem-solving
activities in the presence of outside staff members,
who attempt to use their training skill to help members
of the groups improve their relationship,
[Ref. 24, p 459]
Bowers suggests that the diagnosis might indicate the
need for a number of different therapeutic techniques besides
problem-solving activitieso He indicates that the consultant
therefore must be sufficiently skilled and flexible enough to
conduct those activities that might be suggested by the diagnosis,
[Ref. 10, p. 52] French and Bell add that "this kind of attitude
survey, coupled with a series of workshops involving work teams
at successively lower levels of the organization, can be used to
create action plans and change across a wide range of variables
in a social, structural, goal, and task subsystems of an
organization," [Ref, 15, p. 132]
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The accompanying diagram, taken from French and Bell,
places survey feedback in perspective with other OD methodologies

























The chronic social and technological change prevalent in
today s society has created a need for OD, Sensitivity training
and survey feedback formed the building blocks of OD, Although
there are many OD strategies, each of them usually consist of
the following phases: 1) entry, 2) data collection, 3) diagnosis,
4) data feedback, 5) action, 6) evaluation, and 7) withdrawal.
All but the last two phases were discussed. Although each phase
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is sufficiently distinct, and normally follows in sequence, there
is no clear dividing line between each. In some instances,
phases may overlap to a substantial degree. Each phase is
crucial to the effort, however, the entry phase is considered
to be of primary importance. The relationship between the client
and consultant begins during this phase and can be seen to have
a considerable influence on the remaining phases.
The information contained in this section will be used to
analyze a case study of an OD effort conducted in a ship of the
U. S« Navy. Before doing so, it may be helpful to describe OD
as institutionalized by the U. S. Navy, This will be the subject
of the next section,
III. THE NAVY'S ORGANIZTION DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM *
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this section is to describe the history and
technology of the Navy's OD effort thereby providing a bridge
between the OD literature and actual practice: the case study.
The information was drawn from a handbook for Navy consultants,*
The Human Goals Plan and observation of the system in operation.
The Navy has been indirectly involved in organization develop-
ment since the mid-1940's. The Office of Naval Research (ONR)
has funded important work in the area of sensitivity training
and survey-feedback. In 1947, ONR financed the historic three-
week summer session at Bethel, Maine o The work of that summer
formed the basis for the National Training Laboratory The
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Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan has
also done some pioneering work in survey-feedback under the
sponsorship of the Office of Naval Research,
While the Office of Naval Research is still very active in
funding studies in the area, the operating Navy has become a
practitioner of organization development. The Navy's practical
organization development effort i.s embodied in the Organizational
Development and Management portion of the Human Resource Manage-
ment Program, The Human Resource Management Program is one of
five major programs within the Navy Human Goals Plan.* The
purpose of the Human Resource Management Program "is to provide
to every unit the specific and detailed assistance that they
want and need to develop that particular personnel management
or leadership system which will best .meet their unique needs and
enable them to better utilize physical and human resources,"
[Ref, 14, p« B-l] Within this program, the Organizational Develop-
ment and Management portion has the mission of providing commands
with "assistance of trained specialists in organizational develop-
ment to assist a command in increasing the overall performance
of its personnel towards mission attainment and overall command
excellence," [Ref, 14, p. B-3]
B. HISTORY
A chronological evolution of the Organizational Development





The Navy's effort generally follows the phases discussed
in section II, but the steps are labeled differently. An inter-
vention model proposed by Kolb and Frohman is utilized by the
Navy, The table below compares the steps identified in the









These phases form the basis for the Human Resource
Management Cycle, This cycle is graphically displayed in
exhibit 3, Appendix B, The Human Goals Plan requires that each
command in the operating force be scheduled: 1) annually for
an initial survey, 2) a five consecutive day dedicated Human
Resources Management period (referred to as the HRAV)
, 3) a six
month follow-on visit The Human Goals Plan also requires that
each command develop a command action plan (CAP) for attainment
of the Human Goals Plan objectives.
Each command is assisted in fulfilling these requirements
by a Human Resource Management Center (HRMC) or a Human Resource
Management Detachment (HRMD), The HRMC/HRMD is organizationally
under the Fleet Commanders-In-Chief Prior to assignment to the
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HRMC/HRMD, personnel attend a twelve-week Human Resource Manage-
ment School, located in Memphis, Tenness"ee This school is
designed to provide the skills and knowledge required of an OD
consultant in the naval environment.
The Navy's organization development effort is based upon
a change method called Survey-Guided Development (SGD). The
method is a product primarily of the institute for Social Research,
University of Michigan. This method conceptualizes the organi-
zation in a manner similar to Lawrence and Lorsch. That is, it
is viewed as consisting of specialized groups which are linked
to the next higher level via the superior who is himself a sub-
ordinate at that levelo "Survey-guided development is based upon
the theory that three factors n^ed to be taken into account in
an organizational development effort; the behavior(s) which are
problematic, the conditions which create those behaviors, and
the interventions or activities which will correct the conditions
creating the problems." [Ref. 29, p. 1-2] Survey-guided develop-
ment utilizes a questionnaire to ascertain certain dimensions
within the organization. A great amount of emphasis is placed
upon the correct diagnosis of the data. An accurate diagnosis
should indicate the problem, its source, and its probable cause.
Once compiled and analyzed, the data are fed back to the
organization. The data first goes to top management, who in turn
feeds it further down the command structure via the "linker."
Workshops are then designed to solve those problems which have
been identified. The problems are dealt with by a group problem
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solving method. The results of the problem solving sessions
are then unified into a command action plan (CAP).
2. Entry
Referring to the HRM cycle flow diagram, steps la and
lb comprise the entry phase. Well before these steps commence,
the command has knowledge via the Fleet Commander's Quarterly
Employment Schedule that a five day HRAV has been scheduled.
Approximately eight to ten weeks prior to the HRAV commencement
date, step la is initiated. In most cases this is accomplished
by a letter similar to that contained in exhibit 2, Appendix B.
The letter discusses the HRM cycle and relates it to the Human
Goals Plan. It provides the name of the lead consultant assigned
to work with the command and other points of contact at the
HRMC. It states and explains the preliminary events which
should take place prior to the HRAV and proposes a schedule to
accomplish them.
Step lb is mutually arranged between the command and the
lead consultant. In cases where the Commanding Officer of the
unit is an 0-6, the Commanding Officer of the HRMC usually is
present during this visit. During this visit a more detailed
briefing of the Human Goals Plan and the HRM cycle are provided.
Details regarding the command survey are given and the command's
assistance in implementing the survey is requested.
3» Data Collection
Data collection is represented by step 2 in the HRM cycle
flow diagram. The primary vehicle for collecting data about the
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command is a standard survey questionnaire. As stated earlier,
the command is required to conduct the survey, however the survey
may be supplemented by interviews. The survey is usually adminis-
tered five to eight weeks prior to the commencement of the HRAV
week. The standard questionnaire is given to all units partici-
pating in the HRM cycle.
The questionnaire was designed under Navy contract by
personnel at the Institute for Social Research, University of
Michigan. At the time the case was observed the questionnaire
consisted of 103 questions. However, it has subsequently been
revised and at this writing consists of £$ questions. The
answer sheet also allows the inclusion of 30 additional questions
which the command has the option of utilizingo Finally, the
questionnaire includes 14 demographic questions (e.go, race,
age, paygrade, etc). A copy of the survey questionnaire utilized
in the case is included as exhibit 10, Appendix B.
The questionnaire was designed to measure the areas of
concern defined in the Navy Human Goals Plan. Specifically, the
questionnaire is designed to measure the following dimensions












Supervisor Leadership • End Results
Support Training
Teamwork







Teamwork Alcohol Abuse Education
Goal Emphasis
Work Facilitation Career Counselling
4. Diagnosis
Diagnosis of the survey results is designed to be
accomplished within the framework of a model of an organization
and a model of behavioral causal factors. The model used to
view the organization is similar to Likert's "linker" concept
and Lawrence and Lorsch's model of an organization. Essentially,
the lowest level of the organization is composed of individuals
grouped to perform a specialized task. The superior of this
group is also viewed as a. member of the group immediately above
it in the hierarchial structure This dual role of the group
supervisor carries all the way up the command structure to the
CO and XOo "The supervisor's linking function helps us under-
stand how parts of the system fit together as a coherent, inter-
acting whole." [Ref. 29, p. 6-7] This can be graphically dis-
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It is through the "linker" that the formal processes
of the organization travelo Specifically, the influence of such
things as decisions, policies, rules, motivation and communica-
tions flow through the formal system via the linker. This not
only highlights the importance of the linker within .the system
but this also plays an important role in assessing the data
.
collected. The importance lies in the fact that those processes
mentioned above reduce the latitude or set constraints for the
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bounds within which the lower levels operate. The climate as
exemplified by these processes sets the climate for lower level
actions. Therefore, the fact that a problem is identified at
a certain level within the structure does not necessarily mean
that the cause also lies at this level. In fact, the model
stresses that the cause is very likely to appear as a result
of the climate produced by higher levels in the organization.
The members of ISR have found that the causal factors
cannot be directly linked to one specific area. It is proposed
that there are a number of factors that interact with varying
degrees of influence. Within the context of the survey dimen-
sions, they propose that command climate influences supervisor
leadership, peer leadership and coordination. Peer leadership
is also influenced by supervisor leadership and coordination,
in turn, is influenced by peer leadership. Coordination then
influences the end results of productivity, efficiency, perform-
ance and combat readiness. This can be graphically displayed

















This causal flow pattern forms the heart of the diagnostic
phase of the Navy's OD program. It is the identification of the
causal factors which is the object of this phase. It should
also be mentioned that this concept can also be used to view
a subsystem (department, division, work group) within the system.
The data (an example of which is provided as exhibit 6,
Appendix B) is analyzed within the framework provided by these
concepts. However, an integral aspect of the Navy's diagnostic
procedure deals with the comparison of a command's data with
the norms of the Navy, These norms are generated as a result
of a compilation of all survey results to date. At the time of
this writing, the input data from all afloat commands which have
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taken the survey are categorized into surface, subsurface and
aviation norms. The command's mean score for each of the dimen-
sions and indices is then compared with the normative mean
scores of all surface ships, for example.
It is proposed that the difference between the individual
command data and the Navy norms will provide the motivation for
improvement. The dimensions that fall below the Navy's average
for that particular area are considered to be dimensions that
might be sources of problems. Once the source of the problem
has been identified, then an attempt is made to identify the
cause utilizing the causal flow concept „ Tabulation of survey
results by demographic and structural characteristics further
allows the consultant to isolate problem areas.
The identification of bimodal distributions within the
survey printout can also provide an excellent procedure for
determining polarization of the command within a particular
dimension This added perspective can greatly contribute to a
more complete diagnosis,
5, Data Feedback
Although based upon the principles of survey-guided
development, in practice a variation may be adopted. The parti-
cular form depends upon the intended use of the survey diagnosis.
The diagnosis could be used to design a series of workshops for
the HRAV, On the other hand, it could be used in a manner which
equates to a purer form of survey-guided development. In the




a. Variation of Survey-Guided Development
When the diagnosis is utilized to design a series
of workshops for the five day HRAV, the following sequence of
events normally take place o Before the consultant provides the
command with the survey results, usually three to four weeks
prior to the commencement date of the HRAV, he should offer an
opportunity to familiarize the CO,- and whom ever he may designate,
with certain aspects of this phase of the program. The consultant
should introduce the concepts upon which the diagnosis will be
based. In addition, he should familiarize the CO with what
the survey measures, the meaning of the survey indices and their
causal relationship. An explanation of the norms to which the
data will be compared is also important
-
Having familiarized the Commanding Officer with the
essential points, the data is presented. At this presentation,
the major features of the data are highlighted by charts or
other illustrations. (An example is provided as exhibit 1,
Appendix B.) It is anticipated that the CO will then feed this
information to the top level of the command structure. As a
result of the consultant and CO discussions of the data and their
meaning, it is hoped that the CO can, in turn, highlight those
indices which he perceives as potential problem areas. The
objective of this meeting is to decide what indices the command
desires to improve upon. With this information, the consultant





The purer form of survey-guided development, on the
other hand, devotes a considerable amount of time and effort to
discussions about the potential problem areas as diagnosed from
the survey, and their possible causes. As mentioned above, this
process overlaps into the HRAV week (the action phase of the
intervention) o In fact, in this' method, the feedback process
is also viewed as the beginning of the action phase e As with
the variation, a preliminary familiarization with the feedback
process is necessary. However, rather than confining the dis-
cussions of the survey results to the objective of workshop
design, the diagnosis is utilized more "to focus attention
upon the weaker areas in command functioning and stimulate dis-




For pure survey-guided development, the action phase
is a continuation or the start of the conferences discussed
above. The results of these conferences should be a list of
problems that effect the entire ship. (The same procedure could
be simultaneously conducted for a subsystem of the command pro-
viding that sufficient resources were available.,) The resultant
list of problems are sanitized by removing those problems over
which the command has no control. Additional problems may be
deleted at the discretion of the CO. Once sanitized, the list
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is then prioritized. In turn each problem is assigned to a
group for the purpose of recommending "solutions to the Commanding
Officer,, The solutions should identify what actions are necessary,
who is responsible for the actions and by when the actions should
be completed. The recommended solutions to the problems are then
approved or modified by the CO. The solutions are then solidified
into a Command Action Plan (CAP). The CAP is the final product
of the action phase.* It remains for the command then to imple-
ment the actions outlined in the CAPo A summary diagram of the
complete survey-guided development process and alternative means
of structuring it is provided in Appendix Co
b. Variation of Survey-Guided Development
If the variation of survey-guided development is
followed, then the action phase usually consists of workshops
designed to attack the problems initially identified by the
survey. A listing of the typical workshops available at an
HRMC is provided as exhibit 19, Appendix B. A workshop usually •*"
consists of a lecture or movie about a process or skill (e.g.,
communication) • Very often a demonstration, usually in the form
of a role-playing exercise, utilizing members of the command,
is conducted to facilitate internalization of the concepts
taught. These concepts are then brought into the context
of the members' work environment by discussing their usefulness
in the commando In many cases the members are asked to provide
specific examples of areas where the command could benefit by
practicing these concepts. Therefore, workshops usually attempt
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to impart cognitive information reinforced with experiential
learning' exercises.
The Human Goals Plan requires that a command action
plan be a product of the HRAV. Therefore, if the variation of
survey-guided development is used, then in most cases a command
action planning system (CAPS) workshop is included in the HRAV
for the specific purpose of developing a CAP, This workshop
begins by identifying problems. Problem identification is
usually accomplished by individual inputs or by a peer group
effort. From the problems that were generated, the CO selects
those which he desires to concentrate on. Then, as in the pure
survey-guided development method, groups are assigned the task
of recommending solutions to those problems. Again these
solutions are accepted or modified by the CO and the results
are then unified into a CAP,
IV. CASE STUDY: USS THUNDERBOLT .
A. INTRODUCTION
"Why do I need an HRAV? As you can see from the normative
data (exhibit 1, Appendix B) , I don't need an HRAV," These were
the matter-of-fact type comments of the Commanding Officer, USS
Thunderbolt to the lead consultant from the HRMCo These comments
led off the HRAV planning conference held in the wardroom of
the ship on 21 June 197X. The conference was attended by CO,
XO and all department heads. Also present were two members of
the staff of HRMC ; CDR Al Reagan, 1310 (helo) and LT Bruce
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Dunne, 1110. CDR Reagan was the team leader of Team # Z, one
of six teams at HRMC . As such, he was the lead consultant for
Thunderbolt's HRM cycle.
B. BACKGROUND
USS Thunderbolt had just recently returned to her homeport
from a very successful WESTPAC deployment, and at the time of
the HRAV planning conference, was nearing the completion of her
30 day stand-down period. Nevertheless, active preparation was
being made for her upcoming yard overhaul which was scheduled
to commence in August 197X. Although she was four years out
of overhaul, she did pass the PEB* However, she now faced the
trauma of ten months in the naval shipyard c
The Commanding Officer, CDR Dick Williamson, took command
of Thunderbolt about six months before the HRAV weeko He did
not attend the usual prospective commanding officers (PCO) school,
but instead reported directly to the ship. The Executive Officer,
LCDR Ed Chappel, joined the ship two months later. His enroute
training included PXO school. Both officers had been early
selected to their present ranks. Both had Masters* degrees;
the CO in International Affairs and the X0 in Operations Research.
This was CDR Williamson's third command. In talking about
Thunderbolt, he once stated that "there was a spirit aboard her,
however it was^dormant . Since I've taken command, the spirit
has been kindled and is now on top." He prided himself in his
seamanship ability. He considered the use of tug and pilot
warranted on some occasions, however all too often CO's used
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them, he thought, because they lacked ability and confidence.
As a result it was the exception rather than the rule to observe
Thunderbolt assisted by tug or pilot. This, he felt, contributed
greatly to sparking his crew's spirit.
He strongly advocated the use of the chain of command. In
fact, most of his orders to the wardroom officers were directed
through the executive officer. He believed that the XO should
run the ship and the CO operate it. To outside observers, the
CO and XO shared a very close relationship. CDR Reagan once
remarked that he could count on the XO's thoughts to also be
those of the CO, He also remarked, however, that there was no
doubt who ran the ship
It was not uncommon to hear CDR Williamson express the
opinion that the UCMJ, payday, and liberty-call were the things
that motivated a sailor. He had a reputation, on board, of
being very tough at mast. In one instance, he fined one of his
crew members $100.00 for not saluting him on the pier. The XO
once remarked that his workload was more than usual because of
the number of Summary Court Martials that have been awarded at
Captain's Mast. Grooming standards, on board, were in accordance
with the letter of the book and strictly enforced by the duty
master-at-arms wl^o stood at the brow at liberty call. Since
returning to homeport, the crew has been in four sections.
C . ENTRY
In accordance with the Fleet Commander's quarterly employment
schedule, USS Thunderbolt was scheduled for an HRAV from 9-13
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July 197X. However, as a result of an exchange of messages
between the HRMC and the ship, Thunderbolt's HRM cycle actually
started two months earlier while the ship was returning from a
WESTPAC deployment. On 12 May 197X, Bos'n Harris, a member of
the HRMC Team # Z, embarked two weeks prior to the ship's
arrival in homeport. Upon arrival at the ship he delivered to
the CO a letter from the Commanding Officer of the HRMC (exhibit
2, Appendix B) • At 1630 that afternoon the ship shifted colors
and started the final leg of its homeward trek. The following
day Bos'n Harris briefed the CO and XO on the Human Resources
Management cycle. During the brief, 12 handouts were referred
to and subsequently given to the command (exhibits 3-14, Appendix
B). Bos'n Harris summarized the briefing by stating that,
... the CO appeared skeptical and asked many questions with
regard to the Human Goals Plan. He appeared to be satisfied with
the answers provided and began to be somewhat supportive."
D. DATA COLLECTION
On the morning of 14 May, another meeting between Bos'n
Harris and the CO and XO was held to decide when, how and where
to administer the Human Goals Survey. It was decided here that
due to insufficient time, the CO would not exercise his option
to add supplemental questions to the survey. Bos'n Harris
devoted that afternoon and most of the next day formulating a
comprehensive wire diagram (exhibit 15, Appendix B) of the ship's
organization. During the remaining days of the voyage, the
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survey questionnaire was administered at seven different sessions
to 240 out of the 253 man crew. The 13 members who did not take
the survey were not aboard for various reasons. Bos'n Harris had
one additional meeting with the CO and XO before the ship arrived
at its homeport. This meeting was for the purpose of discussing
how the survey data would be fed back to the ship. It was
decided that the CO would receive the data himself and then pass
it down to his XO and department heads. The date established
for the feedback of the data was 5 June. The day before arriving
at homeport, Bos'n Harris summarized the ship's commitment to
the HRM cycle as follows: "CO, XO, Department Heads, and crew
(except CPO's)* appeared to be excited and enthusiastic about
the Human Goals Program. Note: six (6) month deployment ends
tomorrow o"
E. DIAGNOSIS
After Thunderbolt's arrival at homeport and before the
scheduled 5 June meeting, HRMC personnel processed and analyzed
the data. The raw data on the survey answer sheets were optically
scanned and transformed into punched cards at the HRMC. The
punched cards were then hand-carried to NELC and transferred to
a disc and processed through a program which produced the final
printout of the survey results (exhibit l6, appendix B) The
HRMC has access to the disc at NELC by remote terminal. This
access can be used to delete and change data or to request addi-
tional printouts o The data on this disc is usually erased upon
55

completion of a unit's HRAV. The punched cards however were
returned and are retained by the HRMC. While the data was on
NELC's disc, NPRDC made a copy and stored it in a data bank
which contains the survey results from all naval units. It
was from this data bank that the normative data displayed in
exhibit 1 was produced. Upon receiving the final printout,
CDR Reagan spent about five hours analyzing the data. His diagnosis
appears as exhibit 17, Appendix B. After completing his analysis,
he relayed to his team members the results of his work. Bos'n
Harris remarked that the survey results matched his opinion of
the ship.
F. DATA FEEDBACK
Armed with the final survey printout and his analysis, he
developed a detailed agenda in preparation for the 5 June feed-
back session. Upon arrival at the ship on that date, he and
two other members of his team were introduced to the CO in his
cabin. CDR Reagan summarized his first encounter with CDR
Williamson in the following manner:
He (CDR Williamson) was very interested in getting
right into the survey results. I had prepared a folder
of information for him, but he didn't show much interest
in the contents other than the graph I had prepared of
the normative data and how the Thunderbolt compared. He
then took his copy of the survey results and started
through it. The short introduction I had planned around
the feedback model of causal flow and linking pins was
dropped o I let him have his head with the data, trying
to give him instruction on the symbology and mechanics
of the printout o The cabin arrangement was not conducive
for working with him on his data. He held it in his lap
while sitting across from us. It was difficult to see
where he was in the data. After he had completed his
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readout, I brought up the subject of confidentiality with
him. He stated that he had contracted with CWO Harris for
all of the data. He also started looking at the graph again.
He had two indices that were below the 40th percentile that
he was concerned about, and he became quite defensive about
them and the normative data. I started to break out the
departmental data when he decided that he wanted to get
all the department heads and XO involved. So we moved to
the wardroom to continue the brief. I went back over the
symbology and mechanics of the printout for the benefit
of the XO and the department heads, and gave each of them
their departmental data. The CO was still having a problem
with the normative data. He requested copies of all the
overall command data for each of the department heads.
He also requested a definition of each of the workshops
we can put on. I offered whatever assistance the team could
give him feeding back data to the command. He stated that
he wanted time to look over the data and let his XO and
department heads have time to look it over before he
decided. All in all the meeting was rather stiff.* The CO
was denying some of the data and seemed reluctant to want
to make any commitment around it or the HUM cycle. He was
all business and no time was spent on small talk or
amenities. The meeting did not go at all according to
my original game plan to brief him on a model before giving
him the data. 1
When he briefed his team, CDR Reagan commented that the meeting
was the hardest that he had ever experienced.
The additional printouts (exhibit 1$, Appendix B) and the
list of workshops (exhibit 19, Appendix B) requested by CDR
2Williamson were delivered to him by CDR Reagan on 11 June. At
this meeting CDR Reagan asked if there were any questions regardin;
the data. There were none expressed by the C0 o CDR Reagan again
offered to assist in feeding the survey results to the department
i
It was known to the case writer, but not to the members of
the HRMC that CO, Thunderbolt did not in general have a high regard
for personnel that were initially assigned to HRMC associated programs
'This was the first time that CDR Reagan had given a command
a list of the workshops that were available at the HRMC.
57

heads. The CO again responded by stating that he intended to
give each department head his data and would hold a meeting with
them later that week to discuss the data.
A number of phone conversations between CDR Reagan and the.
XO resulted in establishing 21 June as the date for a conference
to discuss and plan the contents of the HRAV week. That con-
ference was led off by the comments contained in the first para-
graph of the case. Other questions and comments that surfaced
during this conference included: 1) Who goes to an HRAV; a
particular work group? 2) What is the optimum number of people
for an HRAV? 3) Some of my people claim that they didn't under-
stand some of the terminology that was used in the questionnaire,
4) Can't department heads concentrate on their areas of particu-
lar concern during the HRAV?
After discussing these items, the CO then asked each depart-
ment head to indicate>what workshops they thought would do them



























The CO wrote these inputs on a chalk board. After about 45
minutes of discussion, the CO had developed what CDR Reagan con-
sidered an unusual plan for an HRAV week. CDR Reagan had been
lead consultant for seven HRAV's (average one per month) and had
participated as a team member in others. He had not experienced
a request such as this. Normally a ship would select* a group of
from 30-36 people representing a vertical cross section of the
ship to participate as an intact group throughout the entire week.
In fact this is what he had suggested to CDR Williamson. Never-
theless, he eagerly assured the CO that it was an innovative plan
and that he thought that it would work. CDR Williamson's plan
is described in the following paragraph.
For the first two days of the week there were four groups
(A, B, C, and D) of 32 men each. On the first day, group A
received a half-day communications workshop in the morning and
a half-day motivation workshop in the afternoon at HRMC's con-
ference room. Group B received the same workshops but attended
them in a building adjacent to HRMC's headquarterso 'Simultaneously
groups C and D attended a four hour session dedicated to Race
Relations Education and Drug and Alcohol Abuse. This session
was conducted in a building near where the ship was moored. On
the second day of the HRAV week, teams A and B received the Race,
Drug and Alcohol Abuse seminars while teams C and D received the
Communications and Motivation workshops. Consequently, all four
groups experienced the four seminars. Wednesday and Thursday
was dedicated to a Command Action Planning System (CAPS) workshop.
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One group of 32 men (all of whom had been members of either group
A, B, C or D during the previous two days) attended this two-
day workshop. The CAPS workshop was designed to provide inputs
for Thunderbolt's Command Action Plan. Friday morning was
utilized to unify the output of the two-day CAPS workshop into
a rough Command Action Plan. This session was attended by the
CO, XO, CMA, MCPOC, RAFT, the Weapons Officer and 3 of the 4
CAP team leaders. A diagram of the week's plan is presented
below:
MONDAY TUESDAY
Com(A) Com(B) Com(C) Com(D)
Mot(A) Com(B) Mot(C) Mot(D)













PM Race(D) PM Race(B)
Alcohol(D) Alcohol(B)
The Supply Officer made arrangements with Team | Z to conduct a
mirroring exercise sometime after the HRAV week.
G. ACTION
The Commanding Officer of the HRMC kicked off the HRAV week
by welcoming Thunderbolt's crew and explained why they were there,
In part, he stated that studies have shown a need to sit back
and take a look at yourselves and to evaluate special interest
items such as race and drugs. Therefore higher authority has
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directed you to utilize this week to take a look at your ship.
He continued by stating that the HRMC tries to operate as an
assist ship and expressed the hope that as a result, things on
board could be done in a more orderly and efficient manner. He
hastened to add that this is not a substitute for leadership by
saying that no matter how good management is, leadership,
especially the CO's, has to make the decisions.
CDR Williamson followed by telling his crew that he had
told the Commanding Officer of the Human Resources Management
Center that he didn't think that Thunderbolt needed an HRAV. He
then showed the crew the graph of the normative data and explained
how Thunderbolt compared with the rest of the fleet. He con-
tinued by saying that as a result of a conversation with the
Commanding Officer of the HRMC and after giving it a lot of
thought he now felt that the HRAV provided a chance for Thunder-
3*
bolt to become an even better ship. He stated that the object
of this week was to make us more efficient. He told them that
he wanted them to take a close look at the way we do things. He
said that gripes should be brought out into the open. He further
stated that there should be no fear of reprisals, but that this
does not mean a license for disrespect
The CAPS workshop was scheduled for the third day of the
HRAV. "While everyone was getting settled in the conference room
3CDR Williamson had served with the Commanding Officer of




on that day, a short discussion was taking place in the back of
the conference room between CDR Reagan and CDR Williamson. The
discussion centered around the initial procedures for the CAPS
workshop. After a few words were exchanged CDR Reagan proceeded
to the front of the room and began to instruct the crew that each
individual would list those things which he wanted to see changed
on the ship ("I wants"). No sooner had he told the crew this,
than, from the back of the room, the CO interrupted by stating
that that was not what he wanted. He expressed his desire to
have the problems generated by peer groups rather than by indi-
viduals. CDR Reagan hesitated for a moment and then responded
by saying that it was just as easy to do it that way. He then
changed his instructions to the crew and stated that it would
only take a couple of minutes to get his list of the crew members
so that he could identify the peer groups. Again the CO, from
the back of the room, remarked that all that had to be done was
to divide the crew members according to rank. The CO then pro-
ceeded to the front of the room and began grouping the crew by
rank on the black board. A scheme was finally devised that
divided the 32 members into four peer groups as follows:
GROUP I - Officers/Master & Senior Chiefs/
CPO's/POl's
GROUP II - P02
GROUP III - P03
GROUP IV - E-2/E-3
These groups were tasked to deliver to the CO a list of those
things that they wanted to see changed on the ship ("we wants").
62

Once the list was completed they were then tasked to prioritize
the three items of most concern to them.
Prior to commencing, the CO told them that he wanted them
to be honest and that this was their change to be heard* He also
stated that he wanted to hear nothing about the hair length
policy, however the manner in which the policy was carried out
was fair game. After the CO's comments the above teams adjourned
into separate rooms (diagram of HRAV conference room is contained
in exhibit 20, Appendix B)
,
After working approximately 45 minutes, the teams assembled
in the main conference room. There, each group's spokesman in
turn made an oral presentation to the CO and the entire group
regarding his team's list. The results of the peer group "we
wants" are summarized in exhibit 21, Appendix B.
Thereafter the CO, X0 and CDR Reagan adjourned to a separate
room. There, the CO was requested to choose $ of the problems
presented as ones he would like worked on. Meanwhile the crew
members were briefed on a six step problem-solving and action-
planning method. The objective of this six step procedure was
to produce a realistic plan for the solution of a given problem.
Additionally, new team assignments were made. No longer would
the teams be composed of peers but rather as vertically inter-
grated teams as indicated in exhibit 22, Appendix B.
The CO emerged from the room after reviewing the issues that







We need to improve assignment of working party and mess
cook procedures*
TEAM B
We need to improve indoctrination of newly reported men,
TEAM C
We need to improve special request chit procedures.
TEAM D
We need to improve watch bill coordination.
At this time the CO commented to the entire group that
although I've only chosen $ of the issues, I want to assure you
that all issues will be looked at closely and feedback on all
will be given back to you. He once again emphasized that no
one should have any fear of reprisal and that everyone who has
something to say should speak up regardless of rank or rate c
He also stated that he was surprised at some of the items which
surfaced, but not with others.
Having been given their assignments each team proceeded to
separate rooms to work on a plan. The senior man on each team
was designated as the team leader and was responsible for the
coordination and output of the team's efforts. Each team was
assigned a staff member from the HRMC o Each member of the staff
was familiar with the six step procedure and facilitated as
necessary. For the next 5-6 hours the teams laboriously attempted
to cope with the new procedure in applying it to the problem
which they had been assigned. With the help of the staff facili-
tators, they managed to grope through the procedure and were
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ready at about 1500 that afternoon to report their plan to the
CO and the members of the other teams. Exhibit 23, Appendix B
summarizes their plans. The CO commented at the completion of
each team's presentation. One recurring comment pointed to the
fact that procedures to cope with these issues were already in
existence, but evidently they aren't being carried out or the
procedures are not being enforcedo
Before departing for the day, the CO assigned the four
issues which were to be tackled the next day. The issues and
team assignments were as follows:
TEAM A
We need to. improve consistency of liberty procedure.
TEAM B
We need to improve awareness of respect.
TEAM C
We need to improve information flow of middle management.
TEAM D
We need to improve information flow of line management.
On the following morning the team members went directly to
their designated team rooms and commenced tackling that day's
task. The issues this day were a bit more vague than the previous
ones. Therefore time was initially spent clarifying the meaning
of the issue. The teams were more comfortable with the six step
procedure and therefore needed less facilitation from the staff
members. By 1430 all teams were ready to report to the CO.
Their plans are summarized in exhibit 24, Appendix B. Some of
6 r

the group leaders, when making their presentations to the CO,
stated that they would like to continue working on the problem,
as a group, in the coming months,
V. CASE STUDY DISCUSSION
A. ENTRY
lo Deviations from Procedures -Instituted by the Navy
The ship was deployed at the time the initial entry took
place (8-10 weeks prior to the HRAV)o This fact required a de-
parture from the normal entry procedures in two ways. First,
the initial introductory letter to the CO (step la) occurred
simultaneously with the initial visit (step lb), rather than
being separated by a period of time. This departure, in and of
itself, is not considered significant enough to be detrimental
to the effort. However, the execution of step la and lb in
the back-to-back fashion in which it was accomplished left little
time for the CO to ponder the program and its possible impact
on his commando Secondly, and of particular significance, was
the fact that the lead consultant did not conduct the initial
visit. This fact may have had a considerable effect on the
relationship that eventually developed between CDR Williamson and
CDR Reagan, (This relationship will be discussed more fully in
the section that follows.)
The reasons for departing from the normal procedures are
not contained in the case. The following reasons were provided
by the lead consultant for this departure. The initial contact
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was not made by the lead consultant because at that time he was
involved in the delivery of an HRAV to another unit. The decision
to conduct the entry phase in this manner was based on a couple
of key factors. First, it was considered that the period of
time between data collection and the HRAV would have been too
compressed if the survey was conducted after the ship's arrival
in homeporto Secondly, it was thought that it might be difficult
to obtain a wide coverage by administering the questionnaire
during the post deployment standdown.
2. Comparison with Literature
To assess the preconditions of the client, it is helpful
to look at the characteristics of the Commanding Officer of the
ship. From the background information in the case, it can be
surmised that the CO displayed the following characteristics:*
tremendous pride in himself and ship,
professionally competent,
strong disciplinarian,
strong advocate of the chain of command,
strongly committed to the organization and its traditions,
not previously exposed to the concepts of organization
development
•
In summary, it can be concluded that he was a "hard driving,"
successful Naval Officer. He tended to be very authoritarian
and appeared to run his ship from the top down. In terms of
the "readiness" of the organization, as personified by the CO,
it could be said that: 1) knowledge of OD was low, 2) the culture,
especially the rewards and punishment variable was not congruent
with that of OD,* 3) there was little felt need for change.*
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Assessment of the relationship building cannot be con-
fined to the events that occurred during the entry phase but
rather the entire effort must be viewed in order to come to any
clear conclusions. Initial defensiveness was displayed by the
CO in Bos'n Harris' description of his first visit with CDR
Williamson. However, it appeared that rapport was being built
between he and the CO. This is supported by the fact that the
CO seemed to be satisfied with the explanations regarding the
Human Goals Plan and by Bos'n Harris' summary of the command's
commitment to the Human Goals Plan.
CDR Reagan's summary of his first encounter with the CO
indicates that they did not immediately strike a cordial relation-
ship. Reinforcement of this conclusion is found at the end of
his statement that the meeting was stiff and also by the fact
that he relayed to his team members that the meeting had been
the hardest that he had experienced.
As the intervention proceeded, one gets the indication
that their relationship never really solidified into 'a collabora-
tive one. The incident at the beginning of the CAPS workshop
where there was a misunderstanding about problem identification
procedures indicated that communication between them was strained
and not very interactive Q The fact that CDR Williamson interrupted
CDR Reagan to correct the misunderstanding could also indicate
that they had probably not attained a power-equal relationship.
At the opening session of the HRAV week, CDR Williamson
openly stated that he was not convinced of the need for an HRAV
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until after he had talked to the CO of the HRMC and had given
it more thought. The footnote regarding a past working relation-
ship between the two CO's might have been a major influencing
factor in the outcome of that discussion. However, the fact
that CDR Williamson went to another individual could also indicate
a lack of mutual trust and respect between he and CDR Reagan.
There is nothing in the case that would lead one to con-
elude, because CDR Reagan was an aviator, that this contributed
to the problem. However, it is considered that this fact may
have had a negative affect on the effort. This observation is
made to indicate that a CO of a surface combatant might perceive
an aviator as not having a keen appreciation for the workings of
a small ship.
Of primary importance to the understanding of the CO-
consultant relationship is the statement that the case writer-
makes in a footnote regarding the CO's opinion of personnel
associated with Pers P programs. The Pers P organization was
not perceived by the CO as having an enviable reputation. Even
though the HRMC was under the command of the Fleet Commander-in-
Chief, Pers P's prior and present influence in the effort was
known to the CO, and in most cases is common knowledge. This
might have contributed to a lack of trust, and respect for the
consultant.
CDR Reagan's comment concerning the crew's cooperation
is indicative of the fact that the content portion of the contract
was fulfilled. However, based upon the preceeding discussion
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regarding the relationship, it is concluded that the psychological
contract was never made.* It is very likely that the HRM cycle
was viewed as a required evolution and therefore carried out in
that vein. This could explain the keeping of the content portion
of the contract.
In summary, it is concluded that the necessary precon-
ditions of knowledge, organizational culture, and felt need were
not present. Reference is made to Bennis* comment that "one of
the best ways to diagnose the cultural readiness has to do with
the way the client system reacts to and establishes a relation-
ship with the change agent," The relationship could not be
characterized as open, honest, trusting, or collaborative, but
rather as distrustful, non—interactive and not power—equal* Th^
relationship that developed in this case supports Bennis* con-
clusion However, this case points out other important contri-
buting factors which pertain more to the preconditions of the
consultant rather than the client organization. First, the CO
did not, in general, have a high regard for personnel assigned
to organizations associated with Pers P, Second, the additional
possibility that as an aviator, the consultant might not have been
considered sufficiently aware of small ship operations to be of
assistance. Finally, in this particular case, one relationship
began to take shape only to be interrupted during a latter stage
of the effort o The content portion of the contract was made
and carried out, but the psychological portion was never made.
In consideration of the above, it is concluded that the entry
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phase was not successful. Again referring to Bennis who stated
that "the problems that inhere in that relationship are probably
symptomatic of the problems to be encountered," Therefore, an
analysis of the entry phase predicts problems for a successful
change effort in this case,
B. DATA COLLECTION
The standard questionnaire was the only means utilized to
collect data. The CO evidently did not feel that sufficient
time existed to add supplemental questions. It is not clear,
from the case, what particular pressures existed to cause this
feeling, Bos'n Harris* time on board could have been utilized
to collect additional data. It appeared that the data he might
ViCMrp n rtl ~\ a n~\- ar\ woo linqtriir'tiir'oH Q-rvrS nnl ir ncoH in ciimma vnr fo^m .
His statement that the survey results confirmed his opinion of
the ship supports this observation,
C. DIAGNOSIS AND DATA FEEDBACK
The inability to formulate a collaborative relationship had
a tremendous affect on the data feedback and diagnosis phases.
The concepts under which the consultant was operating never
were able to be explained, His role in the feedback process
appeared to be limited to explaining the mechanics of the
printout to the members of the command. The consultant was essen-
tially excluded from presenting his diagnosis or of contributing
in a meaningful manner in the feedback process. As a result
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the diagnosis and interpretation was essentially generated from
within the command; it was not a collaborative process.
The case indicates that the data was internally fed from CO/
XO to department heads and that department heads received more,
detailed printouts of their particular workgroups. It is dif-
ficult to determine the extent to which the data was fed beyond
the department head level.
The normative data became the focal point for the Commanding
0fficer o He became defensive about the two indices which fell
below the Navy norm. However, the fact that the remaining indices
fell within the mean of the normative profile could have contri-
buted greatly to his explicit lack of motivation to continue
with the OD effort. The normative graph so occupied the CO,
that it overshadowed the data printout and its interpretation,
D. ACTION
The pure form of survey-guided development was not used for
the action phase. Instead the variation which utilized the
diagnosis to design a series of workshops was used. Because of
the lack of a collaborative relationship and the fact that the
data did not motivate a desire for change, it was probably better
that the variation was pursued. On the other hand, the supply
department's data indicated that it was an ideal target for a
subsystem survey-guided development effort.
The problems identified during the CAPS workshop bore little
resemblance to the consultant's diagnosis, This raises the
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following questions: 1) is the survey valid? 2) does it measure
what is important? 3) is the wording sufficiently shipboard
oriented?*
The diagonal slice chosen to participate in the CAPS work-
.
shop only contained two officers neither of which were department
heads. Therefore, the policy-influencing personnel were not
included,* This could explain the relatively large number of
committees recommended by the problem-solving teams. For a
command with a leadership style that is definitely top-down,
it would have been better to take a slice of the organization
at a higher level.
The fact that some of the group leaders expressed a desire
to continue working on the problems after the HRAV terminated
indicates that the individuals were deeply involved in meaningful
areas o It is also indicative that group ownership did exist.
This is the most optimistic sign that the effort could have been
successful.
VI . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Ideally, generalities should be drawn from a series of case
studies. When this is done, commonalities between the different
cases provide a sturdy base upon which to draw conclusions. Due
to time constraints, only one case was observed. It should also
be pointed out that the conclusions have been drawn from one
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person's perception. Although the author is satisfied with the
objectivity of the research, personal bias may be present.
B. ENTRY
1. Conclusions
a. Insufficient emphasis is being placed on the entry
phase ••
The literature emphasizes the critical nature of the
entry. phase© For a successful OD effort, the interaction between
the client and the consultant during this phase forms the basis
for a collaborative relationship. The necessity for this type
of relationship is fully documented in the literature. It appears
from the case that the bulk of the Navy's OD effort is concen-
trated in other than the entry phase. Considering its cruciality,
a greater emphasis should be placed on the elements of entry
during the HRM cycle. More energy and effort should be spent in
this phase in order to enhance achieving the necessary collabora-
tive relationship.
In expending this energy, consideration should be
given to the priorities of the client during the entry phase,*
In most cases, the client will likely be under considerable con-
straints due to operational commitments, #
b. Certain preconditions of both client and consultant
are required to support the necessary collaborative
relationship
The literature is explicit in its treatment of the
client preconditions necessary for the required relationship.
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It stresses .that the client should have, 1) some knowledge of OD,
2) a felt need for change or improvement, 3) a culture congruent
with the values of the consultant The case of the USS Thunder-
bolt supports the literature in this respect. The lack of these
preconditions contributed to the unsuccessful attainment of a
collaborative relationship,
Reading the conventional literature leads one to
believe that the only preconditions necessary are those that
pertain to the client. However, the case illustrates that a non-
voluntary OD effort requires not only the client but also the
consultant organization to meet certain preconditions. The
case indicates two main factors which are considered necessary
preconditions for the consultant. First, many fleet personnel
do not look favorably upon the HRMC and its associated programs.
This is due in part to negative reactions to previous programs,
especially in the area of equal opportunity. For many, Human
Goals is synonomous with equal opportunity programs. Secondly,
the professional sea-going background of some of the officers
initially associated with the organization responsible for the
human goals programs was incongruent with the client that he has
to interact with. The additive affect of these two factors
created a credibility gap between the "fleet sailor" and the
"Human Goals people."
Considering the preconditions of both the client and
the consultant, the entry phase for the Navy's OD effort can be






The inadequacies expressed in the above conclusions
could be greatly alleviated by improving both the client and
consultant preconditions. The following recommendations are
proposed as possible means for accomplishing this improvement.
a. Improvement of consultant preconditions
both problems mentioned above have to be attacked, A possible
solution to the first problem may be to separate or disassociate
command development (OD) from the equal opportunity effort. If
this appears economically infeasible, then a shift from the
presently perceived emphasis of equal opportunity to one that
stresses command development is recommendedo A fully successful
command development effort will have as a result racial awareness
and equal opportunity
The second problem should be attacked by attracting
professionally competent warfare specialists as consultants. To
accomplish this requires that duty in this area be perceived as
career-enhancing,* Otherwise, the here-to-for successful and
upward mobile officer will not desire duty in this area. The
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needs of the service and encouragement from the Navy's top echelon
saw the turnaround in the perception of recruiting duty. The
same type of effort would be needed.
Although organizational processes are common to all
commands the environment and the demands under which they are
carried out vary quite substantially depending upon the warfare
specialty. The outsider may see "One Navy." In reality
however, the level at which the OD effort is being targeted,
parochialism prevails to a great extent. Therefore consultant
preconditions could be enhanced by matching client and con-
sultant warfare specialties to the maximum extent.
b Improvement of client preconditions
The client should be more knowledgeable about what
OD is, its objectives and methods employed to attain these
objectives. This requires that key personnel in the command be
educated prior to commencement of the HRM cycle; suggesting
that OD education should take place during enroute training.
Rather than establishing a separate school requiring additional
expenditure of PCS funds, the possibility of incorporating this
education in PXO/PCO schools, SWOS, and officer entrance schools,
for example should be explored. The methods of OD are rather
difficult to fully grasp in a lecture presentation. Derr's
experience in a city's school system suggests that an OD-type
workshop could be extremely beneficial. Therefore a half-day,
non-threatening workshop conducted by a visiting OD consultant
may be sufficient exposure to OD methods for future clients*
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The fact that the Navy, as an organization, sought
help from OD consultants indicates a felt need in the aggregate,
but this does not necessarily mean that the individual unit com-
mand will feel the need. If the need does not initially exist,
the survey results could produce it. However, rather than rely
on the survey results to point out discrepancies and thereby
induce a felt need, it would appear far better if key personnel
could be informed and convinced of the value of OD prior to
undergoing an HRAV (preferably before reporting aboard) o The
emphasis of the education should be that the HRM cycle provides
a time to sit back in order to take a look at the perceived
effects of the command's management processes.
Until the above long term remedies can take affect,
the use of short term actions will have to suffice. To the extent
possible, the above education should be attempted during the
entry phase. An entry workshop similar to that referred to by
Derr might be considered. A CNO personal letter to all Flag
Officers, Unit Commanders, and Commanding Officers explaining OD
principles might be a useful educational tool. It would also
appear that the HRMC could arrange to conduct half-day seminars
with Squadron Commanders and their Commanding Officers. An
antecdotal success story written by a CO for publication in the
Naval Institute Proceedings might also pay great dividends.*
In summary, it appears that education will improve
client preconditions. The fact that the consultant must vie with
other priority items which consume the client's time during the
7B

entry phase makes it imperative that this education take place
as much as possible prior to entry.
C. DATA COLLECTION
1. Conclusion
a. Multiple data sources will add to diagnostic
perspective
The use of additional data to corroborate or refute
the survey results would give an additional diagnostic perspec-
tive of the command,
2. Recommendation
To accomplish this requires the Commanding Officer's
cooperation. With more knowledge of the methods of OD, CO's
will be more prone to see the advantages of multiple data sources.
D. DIAGNOSIS AND DATA FEEDBACK
1. Conclusion
a. Lack of collaborative relationship adversely affects
diagnosis and data feedback
The diagnosis and feedback phases of this case illus-
trate the need for a collaborative relationship.. The lack of
its existence contributed to the inability to affect a joint,
interactive and meaningful diagnosis.
b. In cases where normative profile fails to produce the
intended motivation for change, additional data displays
may be necessary
In the Thunderbolt case, the command's data fell within
most of the fleet means. As a result the Commanding Officer was
not motivated for change or improvement. If the CO's reaction
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to the normative data display is a typical response, then the
cumulative affect would appear to drive towards mediocrity through-
out the fleet o In cases where the normative display does not
produce the intended motivation, additional displays or ways of
looking at the data appear to be needed.
2. Recommendation
More effort and energy should be exerted during the entry
phase on establishing a collaborative relationship.
In cases where the normative display does not produce
motivation, back-up displays should be utilized. Rather than
using the fleet mean, the command's mean could be used as a basis
for comparison. In the Thunderbolt case, effective use of this
comparison could have been made by utilizing a cumulative difference
display. This type of display may be especially useful for dimen-
sions which exhibit a bimodal distribution. As an example, a
cumulative difference graph for the communication flow index for
Thunderbolt would appear as shown in figure VI-I. As it appears
in the survey printout the information displayed in figure VI-I
resides on three different pages in the form of three different
frequency distributions. The frequency distributions are shown
in figure VI-II as a means of contrasting the impact of the cumula-
tive difference displays with the frequency distributions as they
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a. The use of survey-guided development or its variation
should depend on an assessment of the client-consult-
ant relationship*
The case illustrates that without a collaborative
relationship optimistic signs of involvement and ownership did
result. It is proposed that similar results might not have
occurred had pure survey-guided development been utilized in
this case. This suggests that the choice between survey-guided
development and its variation might rest on an evaluation of
the client-consultant relationship up to the point of data feed-
back. If the relationship is assessed as truly collaborative,
then survey-guided development should be utilized, otherwise
its variation should be used c #
bo Crew member's increased awareness of the complexity
involved in shipboard management is important side
benefit of CAPS workshop
Although not brought out in the case, it was the
author's observation that a major side benefit of the CAPS
workshop was the participants' increased awareness of the com-
plexities involved in running an effective and responsive ship-
board management program,* A probable result could be that while
the command is being responsive to its members, the members may
at the same time become more responsive to the command because
of their increased awarenesso In the process of educating





CHRONOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
lo 5 November 1970: NAVOP Z-55 solicited applications from all
Navy personnel with academic or experienced
backgrounds in management and the applied
behaviorial sciences for the Human Resource
Management Pilot Program.
2. 29 December 1970: The selection of 13 officers and 11 en-
listed men from over 1,200 applications
for this program was completed.
3o 1$ January 1971: The 24 personnel selected reported to the
Naval Chaplain School, NS Newport, Rhode
Island, for the initial eight weeks train-
ing and the formation of the Human Resource
Management Pilot Program.
4» 1 March 1971: Project Manager, Human Relations Project
(BUPERS-Pc) established as overall Project
Manager for developing programs in Drug
Abuse Education and Rehabilitation, Race
Relations, Intercultural Relations, and
Human Resource Management Programs.
5. 1 April 1971: Human Resource Management Pilot Program
occupied own quarters, NS Newport, Rhode
Island, began to develop its own organiza-
tion, and define its mission
6. July 1971: First Management Development Training
Seminars conducted by the Human Resource
Management Pilot Program.
7. September 1971: Initial definition of Human Resource Manage-
ment Pilot Program mission as implementing
organizational development efforts within
the operational forces of the Navy.
&• December 1971: Development of specific organizational
development program for application within
the Navy called the Command Development








"N-Man Book" published. Commander, Cruiser-
Destroyer Flotilla TWO engaged as Pilot's
operational client. Initial application
of Command Development Program.
Human Resource Management Pilot Program
terminated and transition to command status
as Human Resource Development Center, NS
Newport, Rhode Island. Human Resource
Development Centers at San Diego, Norfolk,
and Pearl Harbor established within six
months.
First Command Development Specialist
Training cycle to train Navy personnel in
management consultant techniques for ex-
panded program implementation.
Completion of Pilot Program implementation
within C0MCRUDESFL0T TWO sustained program
expansion through implementation at Human
Resource Development Centers.
Initial staffing of the Human Resource
Management Team. Washington, D. C . , for
application of organizational development




Transition of Command Development Program
to Organizational Development and Manage-
ment Program offering full management con-
sulting services and organizational develop-
ment technology to the naval establishment
with flexibility to meet the needs of each
commando
Establishment of the Human Goals Office
under the CNO, utilizing the Human Resource
Management Program as the framework for
all Human Goals Programs, including Race
Relations Education, Drug and Alcohol Abuse
Education, Intercultural Relations, and

























CO to CO Introductory Letter
The Why, the What, and the How of the Navy
Hurnan Goals Plan
Department of Defense Human Goals Credo
CNO LTR. DTD 19 October 1973, Personal to all
Flag Officers, Unit Commanders, Commanding
Officers
Chief of Naval Personnel Cover Article in the
Officer Personnel Newsletter of December 1973
ALPACFLT 003/74
Human Resources Management Cycle Flow Diagram
Excerpts from U, S. Navy Human Goals Plan
Navy Human Resource Management Survey Questionnaire
Definition of Survey Dimensions and Indices
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Resource Management Survey Information
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# Z
"Human Relations or Human Resources?" Harvard
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Commander D. K. Williamson
Commanding Officer
USS Thunderbolt
FPO San Francisco 966OI
Dear Commander Williamson:
Your command, as a result of scheduling at the recent Fleet
Commander's quarterly scheduling conference, has been scheduled
for a dedicated Human Resource Availability (HRAV) during the
week 9-13 July 197X. My purpose in writing is to give you
some appreciation of what the Human Resource Management Cycle
entails under the Navy Human Goals Plan (OPNAVINST 5300. 6A)
,
and to assure you of my assistance and that of the Human Resource
Management Center Staff, and to request certain basic informa-
tion about the USS Thunderbolt,
The purpose of the Navy's Human Goals Program is to ensure the
development of the full potential of its human resources and
application of that potential toward maximum effectiveness in
the performance of the Navy's primary mission # As presently
envisioned, the Human Resource Management Cycle consists of the
following phases:
a. Preliminary Data Collection - Human Resource Management
Center consultants will conduct a series of visits with you to
make arrangements to conduct a survey and/or selected inter-
views, as deemed appropriate. After the survey/interviews
have been conducted and interpreted, the consultants will pre-
sent the data to you to assist in making preliminary plans for
the most effective use of the five-day Human Resource Avail-
ability (HRAV) period in meeting your needs.
b. Five-Day Human Resource Availability Period - Human
Resource Management Center consultants will be available to con-
duct workshops and other training, selected by you, with the
end result being the development of a Command Action Plan.
Co Six-Month Follow-on Visit - A Human Resource Management
Center consultant will be available to you to jointly review
the initial Command Action Plan and determine whether or not




Commander A, C. Reagan heads the Human Resource Management
Support Team that I have assigned to your commando His tele-
phone numbers are 526-3756/8. Commander Reagan will work with
you during the preliminary steps leading up to the HRAV upon
your return to CONUS. Past experience with fleet units has
demonstrated that a series of planning sessions between the HRM
consultants and the unit Commanding Officer are highly desirable
to ensure that the HRM program, and the HRAV in-particular, are
properly tailored to meet the needs of the individual unit.
In order to conduct the Human Resource Availability week, I
propose that the following schedule of events take place within
the periods/weeks indicated. These dates are predicated around
your return to CONUS and subsequent leave and up keep period.
12 - l£ May
18 - 22 June
25 - 26 June
9-13 July
Initial visit between you and Human
Resources Management Center repre-
sentative, CWO William Harris o Sur-
vey of your commando
Feedback of survey data
Planning of Human Resource Avail-
Human Resource Availability week
In order to familiarize the members of the team with the USS
Thunderbolt and productively utilize the time available, I
request you have available at the initial meeting some basic
information which will be used in planning follow-on meetings:
a. A copy of any current Command Action Plan and/or any
Affirmative Action Plan.
bo A list of any formal unit goals towards which you are
currently striving.
c. An organizational chart and the number of officers and
enlisted personnel on board.
d. A listing of personnel who have primary
duties in Human Resource Management matters.
or collateral
e c In addition, include any information regarding the
Command's detailed work schedule that would have an impact on
the dedicated Human Resource Availability five-day period. In
order to maximize both the individual program aspects and depth
of cooperative planning necessary to ensure meeting the needs




If some of the information in this letter or request for infor-
mation raises questions or concerns, please call either CDR
Reagan or myself at 526-7613 or 526-2401 or come by Human
Resource Management Center to see me. I would like to assure
you that the information you give us will be used for planning
purposes and will be held in strictest confidence by the members
of my staff,
I want to assure you of my genuine interest in offering you a
Human Resource Availability week which will truly meet your
individual requirements as commanding officer.
Sincerely,
L. A, Pearcy





THE WHY, THE WHAT, AND THE HOW OF THE NAVY HUMAN GOALS PLAN
Exhibit 3
WIIY A HUMAN GOALS PLAN 7
The Navy Human Goals Plan is an outgrowth of laws passed by Congress, partic-
ularly the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair housing Act of 1968, the Equal Op-
portunity Act of 1972, and the Drug and Alcohol Abuse Control Act of 1970j» These
acts have be.en implemented in the Armed Services by Presidential Executive Order.
Additionally, the All-Volunteer Force has generated pressures for improved util-
ization of our huraan and material resources while maintaining combat readiness.
WHAT IS THE HUMAN GOALS PLAN?
The Navy Human Goals Plan (OPNAVINST 5300. 6A) is basically a leadership/man-
agement plan which consolidates human resource management programs initiated in
1970. It operates in parallel with the Defense Department Human Goals Credo. The
DOD Credo is concerned with the recognition that the defense of the nation re-
quires a veil trained force of people and that the individual himself has inherent
dignity and worth.
WHAT ARE THE PLAN'S OBJECTIVES ?
The Plan is concerned with:
1. Informing people at all levels about the Human Goals Credo and Its im-
portance as a basic building block of Navy life.
2. The implementation of leadership and management improvement programs to
achieve iiicreased command excellence.
4. Reemphasizing the important role of middle management in implementing
policy and strengthening the chain of command. ••
5. Ensuring that Navy units operate as a positive and effective instrument
of overseas diplomacy.
6. .The elimination of the abuse of alcohol and drugs through education and
action programs.
7. Helping personnel leaving the service to readjust to civilian life.
8. Attracting and retaining quality personnel.
WHO WILL BE INVOLVED?
The operational forces including fleet support units through their assigned
fleet commanders, the training establishment through the Chief of Naval Education
and Training, and shore activities through their own individual commanders.
WHAT ARE THE EXPECTED RESULTS ?




DESIRED OUTCOMES OF Till- HUMAN COALS PROGRAM V
1. Improved state of operational and material readiness.
2. Enhance the quality of personal two-way communications at all levels of the
chain of command.
3. Improve the image of the Navy at home and abroad.
4. Develop improved leadership practices and more effective utilization of human,
fiscal and material resources.
5. Provide a high degree of career satisfaction and thereby attract and retain
quality personnel.
6. Strengthen the chain of command. •
7. Development of a Human Goals Action Plan by all commands.
8. Effect Equal Opportunity through the increase of minorities horizontally and
vertically throughout the Navy structure.
9. Advance Equal Opportunity through improved managerial capabilities of cur
majority population.
10. Create an increased understanding and acceptance of the host nation culture and
customs and increase the level of favorable incidents and decrease adverse in-
cidents among Navy personnel and dependents.
11. Increase the number of volunteers for overseas duty.
12. Improve the knowledge, understanding and appreciation for host nation language,
customs and culture in order to increase opportunity to satisfy social, economic
and recreational needs through the resources of the host nation.
13. Create an environment of understanding, cultural adjustment and satisfaction
that will contribute to the reduction of foreign claims, legal action and un-
favorable civil and labor activities against the U. S. government, Navy person-
nel and their dependents.
14. Increase the ability of all hands to recognize the symptoms and dangers of al-
cohol and drug abuse.
15. Ensure recognition of alcoholism as a treatable illness.
16. Modify conditions and peer pressures that tend to encourage drug and alcohol
abuse.
17. Reduce the incidence of drug and alcohol abuse by military members and depen-
dents to obtain lower treatment loads, ease lost time due to abuse and reduce




KOU V.'IT-L THESE RESULTS BE OBTAINED?
The Hunan Coals Plan will implement the integration of Human Goals throughout
the chain of command on a Navy-wide basis. Each individual unit both afloat and
ashore will have responsibilities for practical training in and affirmative action
toward improved utilization of its human resources. Direct assistance to unit com-
manders to improve human resource management within their organizations will be
available through U. S. and overseas based Hunan. Resource Management Centers and
Detachments.
WHERE IS THE ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE ?
Fleet commanders will schedule units under their control annually for a five
(5) day human resource management availability period. During this period Human
Resource Management Centers and Detachments will be available to provide assist-
ance to the unit in the areas of Race Relations Education, Organizational Devel-
opment and Management, Intercultural Relations and Drug and Alcohol Education.* A
Human Resource Management Center headquartered in Washington, D. C. will be avail-
able to provide Human Goals supporting services to the Shore Establishment.
The Chief of Naval Education and Training has been tasked to provide educa-
tion in skill development and human resource management/leadership for all ranks
and rates at key points throughout a Navy career.
Human Resource Management Centers are currently located at Norfolk, Virginia;
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and San Diego, California.
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NAVY HHMAM GOALS OBJECTIVES
1. Navy personnel are Informed and understand the Human Goals Credo.
2. Implement leadership and management improvement programs to achieve increased
command excellence through the most effective utilization of human and physical
resources.
3. Ensure equal opportunity In the Navy.
A. Reemphasize the important role of middle management in implementing policy and
strengthening the chain of command.
5. Ensure that Navy units operate as a positive and effective instrument of over-
seas diplomacy.
6. Eliminate abuse of drugs and alcohol in the Navy through education and action
programs.
7. Assist Navy personnel leaving the service to readjust to civilian life.
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' Exhibit 5 ' ' "*.
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
'19 October 1973 •
PERSONAL ;
To: Ml Flag Officers, Unit Commanders, Commanding
Off
You have all heard about the recently
promulgated
this 'letter to this one subject.
Let "me state at the outset,
that even if there
?£c al -vo^un"e'er armed forces
concept would make^
its implementation one of enlightened
self-interest...




+ r?nou3 i of earlier
.These arc no x,
„, M . ^ „„^i pns p^e indeed real ana no cr it..
S"4i ;ublic"r;ration message is. going to make . ,
_
them go away. # - . •
. To even the casual observer.it is
obvious that ?
practices are undergoing great changes
Utitudcs
.
Before I say anything further, however,
let me
stress that our basic principle has not
changed..
It is exactly what it has been and will
continue
to be- to provide responsive, effective
combat capa-





And the principal yardstick by v/hich we will
measure this capability is also the same -- mission
effectiveness.
What lias changed is our functional environment.
Not to recognize this is to beg the question and is

























































t we must adapt
in order to
ze our manpower.
To compete effectively in the manpower market
with other types of employment, naval service must
provide work roles which arc satisfying activities
in their own right,* and which are seen as making a
positive contribution both to the organization and
.the individual.* - '
One Commanding Officer recently told me that
801 (160) of his K-5 and "below did not enlist for
what the Navy had to offer but ror what civilian
society did not or could not provide
.
If we know this, why then can we not approach
human resource management as we do other systemic
problems? In spite ,.c the ostensible priority
given to people as our most important and expensive
asset, human resource management has lagged behind
our systems approaches to money and material manage
ment. . - '










motivation is becoming an increasingly
roblcm. There is considerable evidence
coming into the Navy today are different
of the past with respect to their attitudes.*
ess conscicntous •* have less respect for
ority, show little concern for job security,
e inclined to want to have some say about
o and how they do it. As I have indicated, •
renecs in attitudes arc due in large part




effectiveness at our traditionally high levels in
this environment, it is an absolute necessity that .
we develop the full potential of our people and
apply that potential toward achieving across the
board command excellence.
With the implementation of the Human Goals
Plan we have launched a dynamic and responsive
set
of programs, soundly based on knowledge gamed .
through experience, research and analysis, and
designed to develop and more effectively utilize
human resources to achieve command excellence.
Our Hunan Resource Management Program focuses
on motivation within a command. In essence I view
it as a systematic approach to building good
order
.
and discipline, responsibility, authority and
accountability, prideVand professionalism*, morale
and esprit, and teamwork. • In the sense that it
seeks these goals, it is essentially a leadership
plan, focusing on what the Navy has traditionally
deemed as having high priority in the fields of ._
leadership and' management. Recognizing that long-
'
term effectiveness is directly proportional to the
amount of individual satisfaction gained through . _
contributing to organizational objectives its
,_i ~,-,.,i -?c fn improve organizational eiiccuive
,gCiic:A.aj... j^*-'"--"- **' l- 1- —--*'* • •#
'
ness b.y increasing motivation. .;
The major premise of the plan is that the human
; system of an organization can.be approached _ m a .
logical, rational manner. That is, that scientific
technology can be applied in leadership and personnel
iwaceineSt aTTtlias been in other areas
*f
manage-
ment! It can be readily seen that the basic Human
Resource Management objectives contained m the plan
arc nothina new for the Navy. Although the words
may be different from those to which we are accustomed,
we have always sought these conditions and -good
leaders have achieved them. What is new is that the.
Human Resource Management Program isa systematic,
planned approach to increasing organizational off icienc)
with the focus, on leadership development and the
human portion of an organization. . • .
• As society has changed the expectations of our
vounc sailors, so must we change our leadership and
management strategics to satisfy their expectations
while achieving our missions. • Once we have achieved .
these basic goals, only then can we expect improved
unit readiness, improved career and job satisfaction,
improved morale and esprit, improved retention rates
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as well as the various other expected results out-
lined in the Human Goals Plan.
The plan was developed on the assumption that
wo will continue to function in an all-volunteer
environment. IV c must compete in the market place
to obtain the necessary quantity of young men and
women to fill our ranks. Once this has been
accomplished we must develop and retain a well
disciplined* professional Navy. How do we go' about
this task? A great deal of controversy lias been
generated over this question, but there is 310 doubt
in any one's mind that highly motivated sailors are
essential to an effective fighting Navy.
Our goal is to provide leadership and manage-
ment techniques and procedures to develop, main-
tain, and improve motivation and commitment to the
Navy, Obviously the first step is to manifest to
our people our dedication to provide an organization
(ship, squadron, station, unit, division, depart-
ment, etc.) which preserves individual dignity,
fosters individual development, secures persona],
satisfaction and satisfies an individuals desire to
belong to a winning team. ' I know of a first-rate
attack squadron that by providing these things to . :
.its ..people achieved a first term reenlistmeht rate'
of 78% over the past 18 months, Its sailors simply
did not want to be traded to another team or play '
out their options elsewhere. Once we have provided -
these same things Navy-wide, our professional sailor
will commit himself to his organization, its rules,!
goals and its leaders. •.
* • •
From the outset I have assumed that traditional
principles of leadership and management employed
by the Navy are basically sound. On the other hand,
the idea that nothing new can be added to improve
our techniques and procedures is unimaginative. Few
will deny that leadership is the most critical
element in producing a highly motivated professional
Navy. But to say that "All we need is good leader-
ship" is to beg the question. We must determine how
to get that "good leadership" Navy-wide. Also, there
is more to the problem than just good leadership.
As we know, motivation is a product of many
factors -- some persona], others environmental. In
general, each individual is motivated to achieve his
personal goals, which arc some combination of
economic gain, security, esteem, and a sense of
accomplishment and belonging. To gain the commitment
of the sailor to the Navy, the Navy must satisfy
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some of these needs. At the same time, the goals
of the Navy -- good order and discipline, well-
trained sailors who work as a team, mission




I believe we can attract the proper men and
women, and that the requisite technical training
can be imparted to them. The remaining challenge
is the development of the professional competence
of this asset and the full and effective use of
that competence to achieve Navy goals. This
challenge can only be achieved by the sustained
application of the finest leadership and managerial
s k i 1 1 s . This i s our .highe s t priori ty. An a 1 1 -
volunteer force in a zero draft environment requires
nothing less. Our officers and petty officers are
••experiencing new demands for firmness; for the
understanding of human motivations; for sensitivity
to the methods of securing human responses; and
for skills in supplying human satisfactions.*
.
•' The Human .Goals Plan is an integrated, systematic
application of the finest techniques developed from
the people* oriented* pilot projects conducted over
..the .past few years. It is designed to attack head-on
the leadership problems confronting our Navy in
today's world. I view it'.as a dynamic and responsive
plan for instilling leadership in the Navy and for
developing and utilizing human resources;
To say again and again that we need better . :
• leadership and management ,• that- we now have a plan
for achieving it, and that we are implementing
the plan is not enough. Leadership is intangible,
hard to measure and difficult to describe. Its
qualities stem from many factors. Certainly they
must include a measure of inherent ability to
control and direct, self-confidence based on expert
knowledge, initiative, loyalty, pride and a sense .
of responsibility. Inherent ability obviously cannot
be instilled, but that which is latent or dormant
can be developed. Other ingredients can be acquired'.
But leaders can be and are made.* Whether or not
they become great leaders depends on whether or not
they possess that extra quality which makes the
difference between the average man and the above
average man. In our focus on leadership we must not
only concentrate on improving, organi zational effective-
ness, but we must also stress better assessment and
development of our officers and petty officers.
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To tliis end, our revised rep
fitness and petty officer cvaluat
us with a better instrument for in
ship and "management ability-.- The
more complex than the previous fo
meaningful in terjns of the skills
successfully meet the leadership
today. They arc closely corrclat
ship and management concepts devc
Human Goals Plan. The data conta
will be more pertinent to prcscrv
'accomplishment and reward and lien
and placement processes. They wi
relevant to the individual in ass
develop as a leader and to better





y are longer and
rms but arc more
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Let me make one final point in closing. Many
of you are already aware that our personnel as
well as our hardware programs are coming under
increasing attack.
Well publicized shiftings of national priorities
have resulted in increased scrutiny of how we spend
•our monies. Now we find ourselves criticized not
only for hardware costs but for personnel costs.
a developing consensus
not through hardware.
'More than that there is
that the way to attack us is
but through personnel under the quite correct
theory that if we- don't have .sailors we won't sail
ships; and if we don't sail ships. our hardware
positions become much harder to defend.
These developments do not suggest easy sailing
for our programs in the mid and late seventies.
They do, however, serve to alert us to the need for
insuring that our internal houses are in order in
the ways in which we utilize our assets..,
Our Human Goals Programs will be examined for
the slightest hint that we are implementing these
programs in a desultory or public relations motivated
way. Should evidence be found that this is the
case then another wedge will be driven between us and
American young people from whom we recruit, and




we do not consider our ethical




of course consider -- our ability to maintain
mission effectiveness is inexorably tied to our
getting behind the Human Goals Programs,
We simply are not in the position any longer
where we fail to recruit a young man or woman
because of our inability to offer a meaningful
disciplined challenge^ or once having recruited
him to lose him after training for the same reason;
or to be doing less than our best in the face of
Congressional, press and citizen's group criticism.
In' the next few years, perhaps more than anytime
since the Louis Johnson Secretariat, we are truly
running in harm's way. Our commitment .-- beginning
with the flag officer at the top -- must be impeccable
if we are to come through remaining 3nission effective.
We are in a new era. We must clearly think
through what might happen should we fail to meet
the challenges this new era offers. . ^
^ -tl *$ /&; -Z^,^
E. R. ZW.VALT, JR.
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DM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL- PERSONNEL
The basis for the Navy's Human Goals Plan derives from requirements levied on the military establishment by
mcjs. The Civil Rights Act of 196-1 and the Fair Housing Act of I96S, the Equal Opportunity Act and the Drug and
ihol Abuse Control Act have all been implemented in the armed forces by executive order. Superimposed upon all of
: mandates is the very real fact that with the AVF a reality there arc limited fiscal and human resources available to
mplish our primary mission of maintaining an effective combat capability. There can be little doubt that we must
lop the full potential of our human resources and apply that potential toward maximizing mission effectiveness.
For the foreseeable futuie, the Navy is committed to a smaller, more effective force-a force which must be
aluntecr and which must perform professionally in a complex, technical environment. There is a very real economic
ssity to meet that commitment at a reasonable cost to the taxpayer.
The Secretary of Defense recently reissued the DOD Human Goals Credo. When we examine that document closely,
ind it formally recognizes that the defense of the nation requires a well trained force and that to provide such a force,
mist increase the attractiveness of a career so that our service men and women will feel the highest pride in themselves,
work, their uniform, and in the military profession. If rJso recognizes in: rMi'il »'»£ infio»t*» j-li*~r>.«
To attain these goals, the credo requires that we stiive to attract and retain good people; that we fulfil! their
ations for advancement, promotion, and job satisfaction; thai we provide true equal opportunity for all; that we help
e leaving the naval service to adjust to civilian life; and finally that we better utilize our human resources in the
Hiiuncc of our primary mission. These are leadership responsibilities.
In parallel with these DOD goals are the Navy's own human goals objectives: enforcement of good order and
pline in a chancing social environment, the creation of a climate within the Navy in which there is an absence of
iminalion, full involvement of middle management in chain-of-command responsibilities, improvement of pro-
MiaJisin and performance, and efficient human and fiscal resource management. Here again, we sec a requirement for
igand enlightened leadership. . -
The Navy Human Goals Plan, then, is essentially a leadership/management plan which extends and directs the human
rcc action programs which began in 1970. It consolidates all such programs and actions into one effort within the
establishment for implementation through the chain of command. It incorporates recommendations received from
led commanders-in-chief over the past year, and it will enable the Human Resource Development Project to be
tablished as a Project Office by 1 July 197-1. This plan provides for the development of individual leadership/
ijcmcnt skills thiough education and training, and it also provides direct assistance to unit commanders to improve
irec management within their organizations.
Under this plan, every Navy unit afloat and ashore is assigned specific responsibilities for practical training and
native
.action to improve the productivity of our people. The plan stresses fundamental principles: those first
'pies of the Navy-lcadciship and professionalism—responsibility, authority, and accountability; good oidcr and
,'line; moi ale and esprit; and pride in uniform.
To meet these objectives, we have developed programs in five major categories that comprise the Navy Human Goals
I. Human Resource Management consisting of: .'••.; ';•
Lradeiship 2nd Organizational Development and Management ..' • , "/
,






' / ]lACC Kcl., lions, and D.ngand Alcohol- Education
/ifoiialOppoitumiy
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*!»/ N'S'TION/Scccuul Career Planning and Assistance
5
'
li'jis'pbn Human Kcsomcc Management Centers
(1IRMC) and Detachments (HUMP) will be established at
7- on centeis iliioiii'.1iotii the
woild. 'Hie appropiialc feet commander-in-chief will exercise operational control
|l0|H1
'.'!"




>t ^of employing, dedicated periods of
lime in the operating schedule will be the method of providing this
11,C C0




J An initial survey
conducted by U\V,X personnel. During this survey, CO and Type Commander
would be discussed and the consultants and CO would establish objectives and a command action
plan.
rentens
^ ^ v ,cck$ sub s:.q Ucnl , Uie survey, a 5-day period will commence with the command and
'
-^i,,,, previous problem areas and existing plans, conducting woikshops, and carrying out the command
1 1^ A follow-on visit, six months later, will judge progress made and
determine additional assistance necessary.
located periods will th.cn be scheduled as necessary.
A Human Resource
Management Team (HRMT) will be established in Washington, D.C. to provide a similar
'










av".j Training will provide training and education in skill development and in human resource
cm nnd leadership for all 'ranks
and rates at entry and key career progression pom's. I will continue to operate
]lS
'\ Mcohol Rehabilitation Centers to provide intensive
resident care for personnel whose rehabilitation needs
'
Ml c "capabilities of local commands and/or Counseling
and Assistance Centers (CAACS). Career motivation




environment is a reality. In it we are competing with the civilian community and other services for
•«
i ',-Pcvvcr pool Of all the military services, we arc
the only one which asks a major portion of our people to go
{ ""'1..^ .,Htndsoivun:icconP>E:ir'J-lour5.'V,Jc-niuit,^f-cc«i'»c. train -these people to perform effectively in a
^x'techniH^nvironmcnt; but technical training alone will not insure unity of spirit and purpose,
productivity,
rtv of oWlimity, good order and discipline, or job satisfaction. Nor
will it insure that our Navy men and women
ri in sufficient numbers to maintain an all volunteer
force. 1 solicit your support of the concept and objectives of the
Hu'inui Goals 1'ian to provide the essential
additional ingredient. Tire challenges we all face today and in the future
lire nothing less. . . ...
CUSi
t '.
DAVID 11. DAGLEY .
VICE ADMIRAL, U.S. Navy
~»sic»r>
- THE OFFICER PERSONNEL
NEWSLETTER (NAVPERS 1j:-0?2)
r^?Tjr^iTKrnz2cacr.-ir<£rrsi^ii^3si^C7J
Published c|ua.teilv in Washington, D.C, by the Bureau of Naval Personnel (Officer Distribution
Divi-
jioiO The .Xcv.-sL'IUr consists of a series of timely articles
concerning the career development, education, and




wlc better undestandim'. Issuance of NAVPhRS 1 5S92 is approved in accordance with
Department ol
L N .vv Publications and Printing Regulations. NAVHXOS P-35, Inquiiies concerning the Officer Personnel
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INCPACFLTNOTE vM^« - HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
.
UPNAVi'NST 53«-;«.o CNAVY HU^.AN GOALS PLAN).
, REFERENCE A PROMULGATED IMS NAVY HUMAN GOALS PLAN* THE PURPOSE
l
; THE PLAN IS TO PROVIDE A PROGRAM QUOTE: TO ENSURE THE DEVcLflPMi; %T
p
-Tiii: FULL POTENTIAL Or THE KAVY sr S HUMAN RESOURCES AND APPLICATION
p THAT POTENT} Vu TOWARD MAXIMUM EFFECT iVENESS IN THE PERFORMANCE Oi-
HE KNAVVS PRIMARY MISSION, UNQUOTE., THE WAVY HUMAN GOALS PLAN IS
URTHI-P. R-'rSIGNER TJ! PROMOTE SOUi.'D LEAOERSHIPj ORDER AWO
ISC-SPLINE* RES :-MMSILILi7Y r AUTHORITY: AMU ACCOUNTAR] L IT.Y9 PRIDE AND
IfcOFESS IDEALISM;. MORALS AND ESPI RIT AMD INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY AND WORTH
JTHJN ALL ECHELONS UF COMMAND-,
» THE NAVY HUMAN GOALS FLAM INCORPORATES A HUMAN RESOURCE
Mii\r,iz:\c>:'{ {MRfi« PROGRAM WHICH IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE CONSULT ANT
AGE S2 a!-:S«''.;-iRA3!;-6-i UMCLA5
ERVICES ANO MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP Of: VELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO
DMMAi-!:). THE WAVY HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM ELEMENTS CONSIST
R1
• A* ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AMD MANAGEMENT*
• R<, RACE RELATIONS EDUCATION* •' •
Co CiVJG ArTUSE EDUCATION AMU CONTRnL,
0« ALCOHOL AROSE EDDCAT.IUN AWIJ CONTROL.
E„ INTERCUL7URAL RELATIONS*
» l.N ORDER fO IMPLEMENT 7HL FOREGOING HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
tOGR'Vi ELEMENTS? INDIVIDUAL UNITS WILL RE SCHEDULED (ULTIMATELY Of-i
i A:\*;\i MAL RASIS) FOR A CONCENTRATED FIVE DAY HRM PERK)!) IN WHICH
WSULTAM7 SER.V1CES WILL 8E PROVIDED Iil THE CONDUCT » PLANNING AND/OR
iVELORKEOT UF :
• A* CUMMAMO WAV. PROGRAMS AND OBJECTIVES*
.
o« coriM^nn hrm action plans*
)0ni'onally there will be seminars available for all echelons
;:T!-un the command encompassing the general topics of interpersonal
WMU-siCATIfiNSr PLANNING AMD GOAL SETTING: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT*
'DIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY, AUTHORITY AND ACCOUNTAS IL I TY P OROG AND
.COHOL /R'.USE EOLJCAYiaN. OE'iMLS OE SCHEDULING AND THE CONDUCT OF
.C£ 3 RH!:Mi 5.RA35o3 UNCLAS
.«•«£:•!; WILL RE FFRJMULGATEO IN A FORTHCOMING CINCPACFLT INSTRUCT I i)M
.
CI.\'CPACFLT S S PRI.JCIPAL AGENTS IN PROVJOiNG CONSULTANT SERVICES TO
1 ECHELONS OE L'.UMHANRS IN THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION Mr MU1IA1V
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^/f:! sy.Vi^? ,^^'VJ:::"I, ? fi!JV lc:fS w=cgssi\ky for supporting the NAVY
li'.A'J Ri:SOO"C: l-'i Ai.'ACF Ml:?." T PROGR.r-.ri i- 1 T f i « :\ ; j!;i: PAC J F T f FLEET
TfP.ATPLY, H'MAM P.r: SOiiRCE iV.'-.'AGSKENT PETACiW^JTS VJi'L HP CUFATFD pi
AM, SUftlC A.'ii) YMKUiUiU TO f.OPKV.T THE WAVY HUMAN RCSilURCF HANAGF-
H\ P;'.0. 7RA". l-HR C'/MCPACPLT CO.irtA'-JfJS ArJO ( EUAA'T ACTIVITIES IM
SlI'ACc.
f)
:C?ftLi^TS WHU HAVE EXPERT i .11= 10 ORGAMI 2 AT I OMAL DEVELOPMENT AMI
ilAf.Er-.FttT, RAO: RELATIONS EDUCATION, DRUG EDUCATION, ALCOHOLOTIDM, AND !«TERCi.'LTURAL RELATIONS,
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Exhibit i Vi j^ccaber iyn
U. S. NAVY HUMAN GOALS PLAN
»
I. CONCEPT
The U S Navy's Human Goals Plan
extends and directs the Navy's
. ?*AJf,I« Action Programs of 1970. It
incorporates selected
Personal ffair, . ^ ^^ Opcratioq
plans and prolans designed to m Kavy ..wlde activity in support
T£Tjtll°l ' f nsetman'conlslrcdo. The plan and its
iVulZZu^lle designed to integrate Human Goals programs
completely throughout the chain of
command.
development of the. full. PoUr^ia_oJ ^-/^ * ~-in the performance of
^flibat JL°te."tJU^oWard.m^^^ • »•
•
ge Kl^primar^^^^rne avy reco gnrz t JJJ *£
^rt^^^&^^
requirements, and evaluation which are
necessary ate
five major categories: ,
1. Human Resource Management
consisting of:
.





. Drug and Alcohol Education
./ 2. Equal Opportunity
v/3 . Drug Abuse Control and
Alcohol isrn^Prevention
.
' l\. Career Motivation . ...
- 5. TRANSITION/Second Career Planning
and Assistance
This Plan assigns responsibilities for program
development, information
prolu ga? n, and
8
training and application of the Navy's^^ FW-
in the employment of the Navy's human resources.
The near-term aim is to
v nt'LL Coals programs so well integrated into the sys em that
these requirements can be managed not only by th,
h gh eve 1 s of
Navy
leadership, but also by the petty. off icers and
the division officer






II. DISCUSSION . ....
Out of the turbulence and tumultuous change generated by the
conflicting human forces besetting our society during the past
two decodes , there emerged an increased awareness of the unique
worth of the individual as he interacts with and is influenced by
the institutions of his society. The Navy, which at once protects
and reflects the considered values of our society, has been no
less invulnerable to the impact of the forces of change. Nor, has
it been less sensitive to the need for providing enlightened leader-
ship in the harnessing of the beneficial aspects of these changes
as they impact on the Naval establishment. The Navy Human Coals Plan
is a reflection of the Navy's concern for the felt needs of its members,
;e
The Plan may be viewed, retrospectively, as having progressed
through three stages and as now being embarked upon a fourth. The:
overlapping stages and their commencement dates can be identified as
Initiation: 1964; Development: 1968; Refinement and Application:
February 1971; and Program Integration: March 1973. The fifth
phase, Operations and Maintenance, is to become, by 1 July 197'.., the
responsibility of Operational Force and Shore Establishment Commanders
supported by the Naval Training Command.
The Navy Human Coals Plan directs a family of mutually supportive
.programs concerned with improving human resource utilization to
achieve maximum mission effectiveness. These programs, Equal
Opportunity, Human Resource Management, Drug Abuse Control and
*
•« cchc ] 4 £,-, Prevcr*"icp. ar.d Career Motivation, are outlined in detail
in TABS A-F of the Navy Human Goals Plan, as is a discussion of Personnel,
Training and Manpower Research.
These programs did not all begin at the same time nor did they
develop at the same pace. Significant events in the growth of the
individual programs since 1964 are^ summarized in TABLE II-l.
A. Navy Human Goals Objectives: Consistent with the Department of
DefenJe Human Goals Credo (FIGURE II-l) and the development of more
effective human resource utilization, the Navy is committed to the
following Human Goals Objectives:
(y To insure that the personnel of the Navy at every level of command
are informed and understand the Human Goals Credo and its importance as
a basic tenet of Navy life;
/'I )
I *J To implement leadership and management improvement programs
at" every level in the chain of command to achieve increased
command excellence through the most effective utilization of
human and physical resources;
{ * > To ensure equal opportunity in the Navy by making prejudice
of any kind an unacceptable practice and to identify and eliminate







' To reemphasize the important role of middle management inimplementing policy and ln giving strength to the chain ofcommand; " VL
i






te the abuse of d™S* and alcohol in the Navyoug education and action programs; ^
to clvIUan'life.^




attract to and "tain in the Navy people with abilifvdedication, and the capacity for growth.
ty,
v
Race lil^—-22—^ 1^ a"d RaC& Rel^i^-^ Education: The Navy's
Ri,v.., „,,__,. .. ,
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The outcomes listed are directly related to one or more of
the Navy's Hunan Goals set forth on page II-l. The .criteria used
in celccting thera were that they had to be:
. Easily recognized as having a logical connection to
the Navy's Human Goals.
. Realistically achievable within the existing command
and organizational structure, and current resource
capabilities of the Navy.
. Applicable to the entire Navy.
Attainment of the Navy Human Goals objectives will:
Result in an improved state of operational and material
readiness with an attendant higher state of unit and individual
training.
Create an atmosphere which will enhance the quality of . .
personal two-way communications at all levels in the chain of
command.
Improve the image of the Navy at home and abroad as a
professional organization which recognizes the personal worth and
dignity of the individual and his family.
Develop improved leadership practices at all levels resulting
in significant dollar savings due to the more effective utilization
of human, fiscal, and material resources.
~A
Provide a high degree of career satisfaction for the individual
Navy person and family end thereby attract and retain quality
personnel in numbers sufficient to support present and future
Navy personnel requirements.
Strengthen the Navy chain of command which will demonstrate
a high degree of pride and professionalism, personal authority
and respect, individual responsibility, equal opportunity, and a
reduced level of disciplinary problems.
Result in the development of a Human Goals Action Plan by all
commands
.
Effect equal opportunity through the steadily observable











Advance equal opportunity through the improved managerial (^
capabilities of our majority population to apply with equity the
rewards and punishments within the system accompanied by reductions'
In discrimination complaints, racial incidents and related in-
fractions of the UCMJ.
Create an increased understanding and acceptance of the host
nation culture and customs that will promote an increased level of
favorable incidents and decreased adverse incidents among Navy
personnel, their dependents and host nationals.
Increase the number of volunteers for overseas duty supported
by an Improved screening and selection process resulting in more
effective personnel assignment actions and significant dollar
savings.
Improve the knowledge, understanding and appreciation for host
nation language, customs and culture, and availability of goods and
services resulting in increased opportunities to satisfy social,
economic and recreational needs through the resources of the host
nation with a conse-quent reduction in the dependence upon U. S.
support facilities.
Create an environment of understanding, cultural adjustment,
and satisfaction that will cqntribute to the reduction of foreign
claims, legal action, and unfavorable civil and labor activities
against the U. S. Government, Navy personnel and their dependents.
Increase the ability of all hands to recognize the symptoms
and dangers of alcohol zr.d drug abuse which lead to reduced
performance, disciplinary infractions, health and family problems,
accidents, injuries, and death.
Ensure recognition of alcoholism as an illness, treatable
/ithout stigma, and promote the acceptance and meaningful employment
jf successfully rehabilitated personnel as effective members of the
Navy community.
Modify those traditions, working and living conditions, and
peer pressures that tend to encourage drug and alcohol abuse and that
stigmatize individuals who choose to abstain.
Reduce the incidence of drug and alcohol abuse by military
members and dependents to obtain lower treatment loads, ease lost
time due to abuse, and a reduction in urinalysis testing and other






1. All questions can be answered by filling in appropriate answer spaces on the
answer sheet. If you do not find the exact answer that fits your case, use the
one that is closest to it.
2. Please answer alhquestions.
3. Remember, the value of the survey depends upon your being straightforward
in answering this questionnaire. You will not be identified with your answers.
4. The answer sheet is designed for automatic scanning of your responses.
Questions are answered by marking the appropriate answer spaces (circies)
on the answer sheet, as illustrated in this example:
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5. Please use a soft pencil, and observe carefully these important requirements:
• Make heavy black marks that fill the circles.
• Erase cleanly any answer you wish to change.
© Make no stray markings of any kind.
6. Questions about "your command" refer to the ship, squadron, or similar
operational unit to which you are assigned. Questions about "your super-
visor" refer to the person to whom you report directly. Questions about "your




1. How friendly and easy to approach is your supervisor?
2. When you talk with your supervisor, to what extent does he pay attention to
what you are saying?
3. To what extent is your supervisor willing to listen to your problems?
4. To what extent does this command have a real interest in the welfare and
morale of assigned personnel?
5. My supervisor makes it easy to tell him when things are not going as well as
he expects?
6. To what extent do you feel supported by your supervisor?
7. To what extent does your supervisor encourage the people who work for him
to work as a team?
8. To what extent does your supervisor encourage the people who work for him
to exchange opinions and ideas?
9. To what extent dees your supervisor encourage people to give their best
effort?
10. To what extent does your supervisor maintain high personal standards of
performance?
11. To what extent are work activities sensibly organized in this command?
12. To what extent does this command have clear-cut, reasonable goals and
objectives that contribute to its mission?
13. I feel that the workload and time factors are adequately considered in
planning our work grourj assignments.
14. To what extent does your supervisor help you to improve your performance?
15. To what extent does your supervisor provide you with the help you need so
you can schedule work ahead of time?
116

16. To what extent does your supervisor offer new ideas for solving job related
problems?
17. To what extent does your supervisor attempt to work out disagreements?
18. How friendly and easy to approach are the members of your work group?
19. When you talk with the members in your work group, to what extent do they
pay attention to what you are saying?
20. To what extent are the members in your work group willing to listen to your
problems?
21. How much do members of your work group encourage each other to work as a
team?
22. How much do members in your work group emphasize a team goal?
23. To what extent does your work group plan together and coordinate its efforts?
24. To what extent do you have confidence and trust in the members of your work
group?
25. To what extent do you see your job as important and essential to your work
group?
26. The output of our work group is essential to our command.
27. How much do people in your work group encourage each other to give their
best effort? '
j
28. To what extent do people in your work group maintain high standards of
performance?
In general, how much say or influence does each of the following
groups of people have on what goes on in your work group?




31. To what extent do members in your work group help you find ways to improve
your performance?
32. To what extent do members of your work group provide the help you need so
you can plan, organize and schedule work ahead of time?
33. To what extent do members of your work group offer each other new ideas for
solving job related problems?
34. Members of my work group take the responsibility for resolving disagreements
and working out acceptable solutions.
35. The members of my work group reflect Navy standards of military courtesy,
appearance and grooming.
36. I feel that Navy standards of order and discipline are maintained within my
workgroup.
37. How adequate for your needs is the amount of information you get about
what is going on in other departments or watch sections?
38. To what extent are you told what you need to know to do your job in the best
possible way?
39. How receptive are those above you to your ideas and suggestions?
40. To what extent do people in your work group exchange opinions and ideas?
41. People at higher levels of the command are aware of the problems and needs
. at my level.
42. To what extent is information about important events and situations put out
within your work group?
43. In this command to what extent are the decisions made at those levels where
the most adequate and accurate information is available.
44. Information is widely shared in this command so that those who make
decisions have access to all available know-how?




45. To what extent does your work group make good decisions and solve
problems well?
47. To what extent do you feel motivated to contribute your best efforts to the
• command's mission and tasks?
48. To what extent do you regard your duties in this command as enhancing your
career?
49. Work group members who contribute the most are rewarded the most.
50. Our supervisor gives our work group credit for good work.
51. The morale and pride of the men in my work group is high.
52. To what extent is your command effective in getting you to meet its needs
and contribute to its effectiveness?
53. To what extent does your command do a good job of meeting your needs as
an individual?
54. To what extent has your work group been adequately trained to handle
emergency situations?
55. I have been adequately trained to perform my assigned tasks.
56. My command encourages training for personal and professional growth.
57. My work group performs well under pressure or in emergency situations.
58. My work group has a good attitude toward training.
59. My work group can meet day to day mission requirements well.
60. My work group is combat ready.
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61. Do you have a good und ». «. ing of
your personal role as a
representative of the .S. when overseas?
62. Do members of your vor e*„u, care
about the Image they pro-
ject when ashore?
63. Do you consider the ef vy c your
behavior on how people of
this area view Navy pe c.oi:.ic .?
64. To what extent do you ::^ to be
fairly dealt with while
spending money in this ir-a?
65. Do members of your vor .... look
forward to visiting foreign
countries?
It m what extent do you •«. v .: hava sufficient understanding
of
"'
the people -d customs ,£ ,k * area to get along in this
community?
•
67. To what extent has inf ^r a been provided to assist
you and/or
your family to adjust o \ ." *g ir this area?
68. In my chain of command there is a willingness to confront racial problems in
a positive manner.
69. 1 feel free to talk to my supervisor about racial problems in my work group.
70. Racial tensions interfere with the efficiency of my work group.
71. To what extent is your supervisor considerate in avoiding the use of
inflammatory remarks about minorities?
72. Race Relations Education Training has been provided to members of my
command.
73. I am familiar with my command's Equal Opportunity Affirmative Action Plan.
To what extent does your command ensure that you have equal
opportunity for:
74. Off base housing.
75. Advancement in rate/rank.
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To what extent does your command ensure that you have equal
opportunity for:
76. Job assignment.
77. Education and training.
78. Evaluation.
79. Recreation.
80. To what extent is military justice administered fairly throughout your
command?
81. To what extent would you feel free to tell your supervisor about a drug
problem in your workgroup?
82. The use of drugs by some members of my work group hurts the work effort.
83. Do you feel that you understand the factors contributing to the abuse of
drugs?
84. My supervisor is effective in helping work group members with drug
problems.
85. To what extent do members of your work group discourage the use of drugs?
86. To what extent would you feel free to talk to your supervisor about an alcohol
problem in your work group?
87. I can recognize the symptoms of alcoholism.
^
88. My supervisor is willing to confront alcohol problems that involve members
of my work group.
89. Alcohol abuse by some members hurts the effort of my work group.




91. Alcoholism is recognized as a treatable illness by my command,
92. To what extent have you been made aware of the career oppor-
tunities open to you in the Navy?
93. To what extent does this command have an effective career
counselling program?
94. How much difficulty did you have in finding housing in this
area?
95. Do you feel pride and enhancement of your self-worth from the kind of work
to which you are assigned?
96. The members of my work group are proud of the appearance and condition of
our equipment and spaces.
97. Administrative practices (such as watch and duty assignments, special
request chits, etc.,) that affect people in my work group are handled fairly.
98. All in all, how satisfied are you with the people in your work group?
99. AM in all, how satisfied are you with your supervisor?
100. All in all, how satisfied are you with your job?
101. All in all, how satisfied are you with this command, compared to most
others?
102. All in all, how satisfied do you feel with the progress you have made in the
NAVY, up to now? .
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Xuate infor^ionM available. Supervisors seek
out in-
formation before making decisions.








' Disagreements are worked out with
supervisor assistance.' . , - ;
_,..., pponnpfP p;.-t»F?SIS The extent to which a commandm^0^i^~M^ resources in the way it organizes its










^OM^^OONIZ"^ SSfSl*rarficul^arerSfS5^?^^^^.^^^P™80 - deClS"
- itos aoout their area of expertise or
concern.
pnMMtHn CT.TMATE-GENERAL Subordinates within
the command^
Jeel that tne human environment created
by upper lev P
visors, working conditions and other
factor is^ ^
;
men'they Second ^r^pacfS diminished whenever
' possible.
UPERVISOR leadership.
SUPPORT There is a good general feeling
-^subordinates
about how they are treate^
by
^^i n^es feeling of worth
GOAL EMPHASIS High standards of
performance are set, main-
tained and encouraged by supervisors.-
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RELATIONS/EQUAL OPPORTUNITY The command has an effective
:
"relations education pro-am and equal opportunity affirmative
|jn plan. There is an openness and willingness to address
:
il issues within the command. The command insures equal op-
'inity and mobility for all assigned personnel. Military Jus-
;
as well as rewards and recognition are administered fairly
equitably throughout the command.
j ABUSE EDUCATION There is openness within the command re-
: Lng drug aouse problems. The factors contributing to drug use
understood. The use of drugs is discouraged by peer group
[j
jjsrs. Drug abuse does not impinge on command effectiveness. Q
ft
; {QL ABUSE EDUCATION There is openness and willingness with- 5
'ie command to identify and communicate regarding alcohol abuse
• Lens. Alcohol abuse is discouraged by peer group members.
ke can identify alcoholism and recognize alcoholism as a treat-
.
illness.
: ;R COUNSELLING The command has an effective career coun-
ting program and a positive influence on people to reenlist.
L.






ia/comn/ator japan yokosuka ja
la/com?.'avmariai,"as guam marianas island
a/comnavforxorea yongsan ks .'• .
ia/c0mu3na7?hil subic bay rp
A/COM-;HVE.\TH FLT
j>/ccmthihdflt • ...
;a/humeegmancen pearl harbor hi
R/HUMEEHMANCEN SAN DIEGO CA
iH-ffTAC PEARL HARBOR HI * '
"
OUZ MAR Ik ......






A CNET PERSACOLA FL
, //N05250//
lEHTIALITY OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ,( HEM) SURVEY INFORMATION
BAVINST 5300.6A • '
IF A DESCRIBES THE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CYCLE AND SPECIFIES THAT THE
:cj;:cs SHALL INSURE THAT ALL COMMANDS WITHIN THE CHAIN of command WILL BE
ILED FOR A SURVEY FOLLOWED BY A DEDICATED HRM AVAILABILITY (KRAV), THE
'E7ER0PED FROM THE SURVEY IS USED BY COMMANDING OFFICERS TO IDENTIFY PRO-
•.RSAS III LEADERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, RACE RELATIONS, DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE,
CULTURAL RELATIONS AND CAREER COUNSELING.
li BE OF VALUE TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER, THIS SURVEY, OF NECESSITY, MUST
I AREAS OF SENSITIVITY. IN ORDER TO BE' ABLE TO GET HONEST ANSWERS TO ASSIST
landing officers and do this with their cooperation and support, it is
e.tive that none of tire survey data be disclosed within the cokmaiding-
pr's ci-lain of command that can be attributed to a specific command, except
iired by that commanding officer .•to permit otherwise would erode the iii-
?'y of command and ultimately affect the validity of survey data.
:e c::o, therefore, desires to establish a policy within the navy that
l( resource management survey data, attributable to any specific navy com-
i'will re disclosed only to the commanding officer amd those personnel he
hates, the hrm specialists assisting the commanding o'ftlcer, and those
ech activities specified by the cno> deviations from this policy will not
k>e except upon approval of the dcno (manpower)
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Recent evidence indicates that business
managers have now adopted not one but two
theories of -participative leadership.
For their subordinates, managers prefer a
human relations approach, aimed at
improving morale and reducing resistance to
formal authority. For themselves,
however, they prefer a human resources
approach, whereby they want their
superiors to recognize and make full use of
their ozun currently zvasted talents. The
author is Raymond E. Miles, Assistant
Professor of Business Administration at the
University of California, Berkeley.
• The Editors
The proselyting efforts of the
advocates of participative manage-
ment appear to have paid off. The
typical modern manager, on paper
at least, broadly endorses partici-
pation and rejects traditional, au-
tocratic concepts of leadership and
control as no -longer acceptable or,
perhaps, no longer legitimate.
However, while participation has
apparently been well merchandised
and widely purchased, there seems
to be a great deal of confusion
about what has been sold and
what has been bought. Managers
do not appear to have accepted a
single, logically consistent concept
of participation. In fact, there is
reason to believe that managers
have adopted two different theo-
ries or models of participation —
one for themselves and one for
their subordinates.
These statements reflect both
my analysis of the development of
the theory of participative man-
agement and my interpretation of
managers' attitudes toward these
concepts.
My views are based in part on
a number of recent surveys of
managers' beliefs and opinions.
The most recent of these stud-
ies, which I conducted, was begun
with a group of 215 middle and
upper level managers in West
Coast companies, and has been
continued with a sample of over
300 administrators from public
agencies. 1 This study was designed
to clarify further curtain aspects
of managers' attitudes uncovered
by earlier research under the direc-
tion of Dale Yoder of Stanford -
and Profs. Mason Haire, Edwin
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jhiselii, and Lyman Porter of the
Jniversity of California, Berkeley. 11
This series of studies involved
he collection of questionnaire data
>n managers' opinions about peo-
ile and on their attitudes toward
'arious leadership policies and
)ractices. Several thousand man-
igers in all, both here and abroad,
lave participated.
This article is not intended to
;ummarize all of the findings
in managers' leadership attitudes
ivailable from these studies. Rath-
:r, my primary purpose is to con-
itruct a theoretical framework that
nay explain some of the principal
limensions of managers' views
md some of the implications of
heir beliefs and opinions, drawing
>n the research simply to illustrate
ny views.
'articipative Theories
While the suggestion that man-
igers have accepted a two-sided
approach to participation may be
iisturbing, it should not be too
iurprising. Management theorists
lave frequently failed to deal with
)articipation in a thorough and
insistent manner. Indeed, from
in examination of their somewhat
imbivalent treatment of this con-
cept, it is possible to conclude that
hey have been selling two signifi-
cantly different models of parti-
ipative management.
T One of the scholars' models,
vhich we will designate the human
elations model, closely resembles the
onccpt of participation which man-
igers appear to accept for use with
heir own subordinates.
The second, and not yet fully
leve'.oped, theory, which 1 have la-
beled the Jiuman resources model,
prescribes the sort of participative
policies that managers would appar-
ently like their superiors to follow.
I shall develop and examine
these two models, compare them
with managers' expressed beliefs,
and consider some of the implica-
tions of managers' dual allegiance
to them.
, .
Both the human relations and
the human resources models have
three basic components:
1. A set of assumptions about
people's values and capabilities.
2. Certain prescriptions as to the
amount and kind of participative
policies and practices that managers
should follow, in keeping with their
assumptions about people.
3. A set of expectations with re-
spect to the effects of participation
on subordinate morale and perfor-
mance.
This third component contains
the model's explanation of how
and why participation works —
that is. the purpose of participation
and how it accomplishes this pur-
pose. In outline form, the models
may be summarized as shown in
Exhibit i.
Human Relations Model
This approach is not new. As
early as the 1920's, business
spokesmen began to challenge the
classical autocratic philosophy of
management. The employee was
no longer pictured as merely an
appendage to a machine, seeking
only economic rewards from his
work. Managers were instructed
to consider him as a "whole man''
rather than as merely a bundle of
skills and aptitudes. 4 They were
urged to create a "sense of satis-
faction" among their subordinates
by showing interest in the em-
ployees' personal success and wel-
fare. As Bendix notes, the "failure
to treat workers as human beings
came to be regarded as the cause
of low morale, poor craftsman-
ship, unresponsiveness, and con-
fusion." •"'
The key element in the liuman
relations approach is its basic ob-
jective of making organizational
members nci a userui aim impor-
tant part of the overall effort. This
process is viewed as the means of
accomplishing the ultimate goal
of building a cooperative and com-
pliant work force. Participation,
in this model, is a lubricant which
oils away resistance to formal au-
Autiior's note: This article has bene-
fited greatly from the comments of Pro-
fessors Mason Haire and George Strauss
of the University of California, Berkeley.
1 See Raymond E. Miles, "Conflicting
Elements in Managerial Ideologies,'" In-
dustrial Relations, October 1964, pp.
77-91. The subsequent research with
public administrators is still being con-
ducted, and reports have not yet been
published.
1 See Dale Yoder, "Management Theo-
ries as Managers See Them," Personnel,
July-August 1962, pp. 25-30; "Man-
agement Policies for the Future," Per-
sonnel Administration, September-Octo-
ber 1962, pp. 11-14 if-; Dale Yoder et
al, "Managers' Theories of Manage-
ment," Journal of tlie Academy of Man-
agement, September 1963, pp. 204-211.
J See Mason Hairc, Edwin Ghisclli,
and Lyman W. Porter, "Cultural Pat-
terns in the Role of the Manager," In-
dustrial Relations, February 1903, pp.
95~l*7i for a report on the Berkeley
studies.
1 See Rcinhard Bendix, Work and Au-
thority in Industry (New Yoik. John
Wiley and Sons, 195b;, pp. 267-340.
' Ibid., p. 294.
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Exhibit i. Two :viOdels of participative leadership
HUMAN RELATIONS HUMAN RESOURCES
1. People in our culture share a common set of
needs — to belong, to be liked, to be respected.
2. They desire individual recognition but, more
than this, they want to feel a useful part of
the company and their own work group or
department.
3. They will tend to cooperate willingly and com-
ply with organizational goals if these impor-
tant needs are fulfilled.
ATTITUDES TOWARD PEOPLE
1 In addition to sharing common needs for be-
longing and respect, most people in our cul-
ture desire to contribute effectively and cre-
atively to the accomplishment of worthwhile
objectives.
The majority of our work force is capable of
exercising far more initiative, responsibility,
and creativity than their present jobs require
or allow.
These capabilities represent untapped re-
sources which are presently being wasted.
The manager's basic task is to make each
worker believe that he is a useful and impor-
tant part of the department "team."
The manager should be willing to explain his
decisions and to discuss his subordinates' ob-
jections to his plans. On routine matters, he
ct)on 'd OTi ro iJ ro. fTG hi° r,j t^^di^atcs tc r^nrtici-
pate in planning and choosing among alterna-
tive solutions to problems.
Within narrow limits, the work group or in-
dividual subordinates should be allowed to
exercise self-direction and self-control in car-
rying out plans.
KIND AND AMOUNT OF PARTICIPATION
1. The manager's basic task is to create an en-
vironment in which his subordinates can con-
tribute their full range of talents to the ac-
complishment of organizational goals. He
must attempt to uncover and tap the creative
resources of his subordinates.
The manager should allow, and encourage,
his subordinates to participate not only in
routine decisions but in important matters as
well. In fact, the more important a decision
is to the manager's department, the greater
should be his effort to tap the department's
resources.
The manager should attempt to continually
expand the areas over which his subordinates
exercise self-direction and self-control as they
develop and demonstrate greater insight and
ability.
EXPECTATIONS
Sharing information with subordinates and
involving them in departmental decision mak-
ing will help satisfy their basic needs for be-
longing and for individual recognition.
Satisfying these needs will improve subordi-
nate morale and reduce resistance to formal
authority.
High employee morale and reduced resistance
to formal authority may lead to improved de-
partmental performance. It should at least
reduce intradepartment friction and thus
make the manager's job easier.
1. The overall quality of decision making and
performance will improve as the manager
makes use of the full range of experience,
insight, and creative ability in his department.
2. Subordinates will exercise responsible self-
direction and self-control in the accomplish-
ment of worthwhile objectives that they un-
derstand and have helped establish.
3. Subordinate satisfaction will increase as a by-
product of improved performance and the op-
portunity to contribute creatively to this im-
provement.
TE: It may f.iirlv be argued that what I call the human relations mode! is actually (lie product of popularization
understanding of the work of pioneers in this field. Moreover, it is true that some of the early research and
Ffisof the human rei.ttionists contain concepts which seem to fall within the framework of what I call the
fj'i resources model. Nevertheless, it is my opinion that while the early writers did not advocate the liuirtan rela-
"0| iiodel as presented here, their failure to emphasize certain of the human resources concepts left their work
Ir o the misinterpretations which have occurred.
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lority. By discussing problems
ith his subordinates and acknowl-
jging their individual needs and
csircs, the manager hopes to build
cohesive work team that ,is will-
ig and anxious to tangle with
rganizational problems.
One further clue to the way
l which participation is viewed in
lis approach is provided in Du-
in's concept of "privilege pay." °
he manager "buys" cooperation
f
letting his subordinates in on
;partmental information and al-
wing them to discuss and state
leir opinions on various depart-
ental problems. He "pays a
ice" for allowing his subordinates
ie privilege of participating in
rtain decisions and exercising
ime self-direction. In return he
)pes to obtain their cooperation
carrying out these and other de-
sions for the accomplishment of
:partmental objectives.
Implicit in this model is the idea
at it might actually be easier
id more efficient if the manager
oild merely make departmental
dsions without bothering to in-
'lve his subordinates. However,
the advocates of this model
tint out, there are two parts to
ty decision — (i ) the making of
e decision and (2) the activities
quired to carry it out. In many
stances, this model suggests, the
anager might do better to "waste
ne" in discussing the problem
th his subordinates, and perhaps
en to accept suggestions that he
lieves may be less efficient, in
der to get the decision carried
t.
In sum, the human relations ap-
oach does not bring out the fact
at participation may be useful
r its own sake. The possibility
at subordinates will, in fact,
ing to light points which the
inager may have overlooked, if
nsidered at all, tends to be men-
med only in passing. This is
ated as a potential side benefit
rich, while not normally expect-
,
may occasionally occur. In-
ad, the manager is urged to
opt participative leadership poli-
'S as the least-cost method of ob-
ning cooperation and getting his
cisions accepted.
in many ways the human re-
lations model represents only a
slight departure from traditional
autocratic models of management.
The method of achieving results
is different, and employees- are
viewed in more humanistic terms,
but the basic roles of the manager
and his subordinates remain essen-
tially the same. The ultimate
goal sought in both the traditional
and the human relations model is
compliance with managerial au-
thority.
Human Resources Model
This approach represents a dra-
matic departure from traditional
concepts of management. Though
not yet fully developed, it is emerg-
ing from the writings of McGregor,
Likert, Haire, and others as a new
and significant contribution to
management thought." The mag-
nitude of its departure from previ-
ous models is illustrated first of all
in its basic assumptions concern-
ing people's values and abilities,
which focus attention on all or-
ganization members as reservoirs
of untapped resources. These re-
sources include not only physical
skills and energy, but also crea-
tive ability and the capacity for re-
sponsible, self-directed, self-con-
trolled behavior. Given these as-
sumptions about people, the man-
ager's job cannot be viewed mere-
ly as one of giving direction and
obtaining cooperation. Instead, his
primary task becomes that of cre-
ating an environment in which the
total resources of his department
can be utilized.
The second point at which the
human resources model differs
dramatically from previous mod-
els is in its views on the purpose
and goal of participation. In this
model the manager does not share
information, discuss departmental
decisions, or encourage self-direc-
tion and self-control merely to im-
prove subordinate satisfaction and
morale. Rather, the purpose of
these practices is to improve the
decision making and total per-
formance efficiency of the organi-
zation. The human resources mod-
el suggests that many decisions
may actually !>e made more effi-
ciently by those directly involved
in and affected by the decisions.
Similarly, this model implies
that control is often most efficient-
ly exercised by those directly in-
volved in the work in process,
rather than by someone or some
group removed from the actual
point of operation. Moreover, the
human resources model does not
suggest that the manager allow
participation only in routine deci-
sions. Instead, it implies that the
more important the decision, the
greater is his obligation to encour-
age ideas and suggestions from his
subordinates.
In the same vein, this model
docs not suggest that the manager
allow his subordinates to exercise
self-direction and self-control on-
ly when they are carrying out rela-
tively unimportant assignments.
In fact, it suggests that the area
over which subordinates exercise
self-direction and control should
be continually broadened in keep-
ing with their growing experience
and ability.
The crucial point at which this
model differs dramatically from
other models is in its explanation
of the causal relationship between
satisfaction and performance. In
the human relations approach im-
provement in subordinate satisfac-
tion is viewed as an intervening
variable which is the ultimate
cause of improved performance.
Diagrammatically, the causal rela-
tionship can be illustrated as in
Exhibit ii.
In the Jiuman resources model
the causal relationship between
satisfaction and performance is
viewed quite differently. Increased
subordinate satisfaction is not pic-
tured as the primary cause of
6 Robert Dubin, The World of Work
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1958), pp. 243-244. It should
be noted that Dubin treats the concept
of privilege pay within a framework
which goes beyond the human reLitions
approach and, in some respects, is close
to the human resources model.
" See particularly Douglas McGregor,
Tfie Human Side of Enterprise (New
York, McGraw-Hill Hook Company. Inc.,
19G0); Rensis Likert, New Patterns of
Mayiagement (New York, McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc., 1961); and Mason
Haire, "The Concept of Power and the
Concept of Man," in Sociul Science Ap-
proaches to Business Behavior, edited
by George Strother (Homcwood, Illinois,



















ment results directly from creative
contributions which subordinates
make to departmental decision
making, direction, and control.
Subordinates' satisfaction is viewed
instead as a by-product of the
process — the result of their hav-
ing made significant contributions
to organizational success. In dia-
gram form the human resources
model can be illustrated as in Ex-
hibit tii.
The human rp^onrres model
does not deny a relationship be-
tween participation and morale.
It suggests that subordinates' satis-
faction may well increase as they
play more and more meaningful
roles in decision making and con-
trol. Moreover, the model recog-
nizes that improvements in morale
may not only set the stage for ex-
panded participation, but create
an atmosphere which supports cre-
ative problem solving. Neverthe-
less, this model rejects as unsup-
ported the concept that the im-
provement of morale is a neces-
sary or sufficient cause of im-
proved decision making and con-
trol. Those improvements come di-
rectly from the full utilization of
the organization's resources.
Managers' Own Views
Which approach to participative
management do managers actual-
ly follow? It was suggested earlier
that managers' views appear to re-
flect both models. When they talk
about the kind and amount of par-
ticipation appropriate for their
subordinates, they express con-
cepts that appear to be similar to
those in the human relations mod-
el. On the other hand, when they
consider their own relationships
with their superiors, their views
seem to flow from the human
resources model. A brief review
of the relevant findings suggests
some of the bases for this inter-
pretation.
















Participation for subordinates —
When we look at managers' views
on the use of participative policies
and practices with the subordi-
nates who report to them, two
points seem clear:
V Managers generally accept and
endorse the use of participative con-
cepts.
A However, they frequently doubt
their subordinates' capacity for self-
direction and self-control, and their
ability to contribute creatively to de-
partmental decision making.
In the Stanford studies, an over-
whelming majority of managers
indicated their agreement with
statements emphasizing the desir-
ability of subordinate participation
in decision making. s In the Berke-
ley studies, a majority of the man-
agers in each of u countries, in-
cluding the United States, indi-
cated their agreement with such
concepts as sharing information
with subordinates and increasing
subordinate influence and self-
control. 9 Similarly, in my recent
studies, managers overwhelming-
ly endorsed participative leader-
ship policies.
On the other hand, while man-
agers appear to have great faith in
participative policies, they do not
indicate such strong belief in their
subordinates' capabilities. For ex-
ample, the Berkeley group in their
international study found that
managers tended to have a "basic
lack of confidence in others" and
typically did not believe that ca-
pacity for leadership and initiative
was widely distributed among sub-
ordinates. 10 In my own study,
managers in every group to date
have rated their subordinates and
rank-and-file employees well below
themselves, particularly on such
important managerial traits as re-
sponsibility, judgment, and initia-
tive.
But if managers do not expect
creative, meaningful contributions
from their subordinates, why do
they advocate participative man-
agement? A reasonable answer
seems to be that they advocate
participative concepts as a means
of improving subordinate morale
and satisfaction. Tins interpreta-
tion gains support from my recent
studies. Here, managers were
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asked to indicate their agreement
or
disagreement with statements
predicting improved morale and
satisfaction and statements pre-
dicting improved performance as
the result of following various par-
ticipative leadership policies. In
connection with each of these pol-
icies, managers indicated consist-
ently greater agreement with the
predictions of improved morale
than with the predictions of im-
proved performance.
The fact that managers appear
to have serious doubts about the
values and capabilities of those re-
porting to them seems to rule out
their acceptance of the human re-
sources model for use with their
subordinates. On the other hand,
the fact that they do endorse par-
ticipation and seem quite certain
about its positive impact on mo-
rale suggests a close relationship
between their views and those ex-
pressed in the human relations
model. Moreover, the types of par-
ticipative policies which managers
most strongly advocate seem to
support this interpretation.
In my research, managers indi-
cate strongest agreement with pol-
icies that advocate sharing infor-
mation and discussing objectives
with subordinates. However, they
tend to be somewhat less enam-
ored with the policies which sug-
gest increasing subordinate self-
direction and self-control. This
pattern of participation seems
much closer to that of the human
relations approach than to the pat-
tern advocated in the human re-
sources model.
Participation for tJicmselves —
When I examined managers' views
toward their relationships with
their own superiors, a much dif-
ferent pattern of responses became
evident
:
(1) Managers in my studies tend
to see little, if any, 'difference be-
tween their own capabilities and
those of their superiors. In fact, they
tend to rate themselves equal to, if
not higher than, their superiors on
such traits as creativity, ingenuity,
flexibility, and willingness to change.
(2) When asked to indicate at
which levels in their organizations
'
'they feel each of the participative
policies would be most appropriate,
managers invariably feel most strong-
ly that the full range of participative
policies should be used by tbeir own
superiors.
More importantly, they also tend
to be most certain that these par-
ticipative policies will result in
improved organizational perform-
ance at their own level.
Thus, when managers discuss
the type of participative policies
which their superiors should fol-
low with managers at their own
level, they appear to espouse the
human resources model. They see
themselves as reservoirs of cre-
ative resources. Moreover, the fact
that they frequently view them-
selves as' more flexible and willing
to change than their superiors sug-
gests that they feel their resources
are frequently wasted. Correspond-
ingly, they expect improvement in
organizational performance to re-
sult from greater freedom for self-
direction and self-control on their
part.
Reasons Behind Views
If the evidence of the current
survey deer. repre cr> >">t managers'
attitudes toward participative lead-
ership, one serious question im-
mediately comes to mind. How
can managers desire one type of
authority and control relationship
with their superiors and at the
same time advocate another type
with their subordinates? A gen-
eral answer, of course, is that this
pattern- of attitudes is just human
nature. We tend not only to think
more highly of ourselves than we
do of others, but also to want more
than we are willing to give. There
are, however, other logical, more
specific explanations for managers'
reluctance to accept the human re-
sources model for use with their
subordinates.
In the first place, the human re-
lations model has been around
much longer, and an exceptional-
ly good selling job has been done
in its behalf. The causal relation-
ship among participation, satisfac-
tion, and performance, despite a
lack of empirical validation, has
become common wisdom. '1 he hu-
man resources model, on the other
hand, has not been as fully or sys-
tematically developed, and has not
been the subject of as hard a sell.
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Managers may "feel" some of the
concepts expressed in the human
resources model and intuitively
grasp some of their implications
for their relationships with their
superiors, but little pressure has
been put on them to translate
their attitudes into a systematic
model for use with their subordi-
nates.
A second explanation for man-
agers' failure to accept the hu-
man resources model for use with
their subordinates is that they are
simply reluctant to "buy" a the-
ory that challenges concepts to
which they are deeply and emotion-
ally attached. There is no ques-
tion that the human resources
model does attack a number of
traditional management concepts.
Two of the bedrock concepts that
are directly challenged deal with:
(i) the origins and applicability
of management prerogatives, and
(2) the source and limits of con-
trol.
The human resources model
recognizes no definable, immutable
set of management prerogatives.
It does net accept the classical di-
vision between those who thinn.
and command and those who obey
and perform. Instead, it argues
that the solution to any given prob-
lem may arise from a variety of
sources, and that to think of man-
agement (or any other group) as
sufficient in and of itself to make
all decisions is misleading and
wasteful.
This approach does not directly
challenge the 'legal" right of man-
agement to command. It suggests,
however, that there is a higher
"law of the situation" that thought-
ful managers will usually observe,
deferring to expertise wherever it
may be found. In this model the
manager's basic obligation is not
to the "management team" but to
the accomplishment of departmen-
tal and organizational objectives.
The criterion of success, therefore,
is not the extent to which orders
are carried out but the results ob-
tained.
Admitting that he may not have
'Yodor ct al, "Managers* Theories of
Management," op. tit.
•H.urc, Ghiselli. and Porter, op. cit.
•" Haire, Ghiselli, and Porter, op. cit.

all the answers is as difficult for
the manager as for any of the rest
of us. lie has been taught to hide
his deficiencies, not to advertise
them. Holding on to- information,
maintaining close control, and re-
serving the right to make all deci-
sions are ways by which the man-
ager can ensure his importance.
Further, many organizations have
reinforced this type of behavior
either (a) by failing to emphasize
the manager's obligation to devel-
op and utilize his human resources
or (b) by failing to reward him
when he does make this effort.
In the area of control the hu-
man resources model challenges
the traditional concept that control
is a scarce resource. In traditional
theory there is presumed to be a
virtually fixed amount of control.
This fixed amount can be distrib-
uted in a variety of ways, but con-
trol given to one group must even-
tually be taken away from another.
Given this concept, the manager
is reluctant to allow his subordi-
nates any real degree of self-con-
trol — what he gives up to them,
he loses himself. In fact, it is fre-
quently this basic fear cf losing
control which limits the amount of
participation that managers are
willing to allow.
The human resources model
does not accept this lump-of-eon-
trol theory. Instead, it argues that
the manager increases his total
control over the accomplishment
of departmental objectives by en-
couraging self-control on the part
of his subordinates. Control is
thus an additive and an expand-
ing phenomenon. Where subordi-
nates are concerned with accom-
plishing goals and exercising self-
direction and self-control, their
combined efforts will far outweigh
the results of the exercise of any
amount of control by the manager.
Moreover, the fact that subordi-
nates desire to exercise greater self-
control does not mean that they
reject the manager's legitimate
concern for goal accomplishment.
Rather, there is evidence that they
in fact seek a partnership that will
allow them to play a larger role,
yet also will allow for a correspond-
ing increase in management's con-
trol activity. 11
In all, the fact that managers
are reluctant to adopt a model
which forces them to rethink, and
perhaps restructure, their percep-
tions of their own roles and func-
tions is not surprising. It is also
not surprising that some writers
in this field have hesitated to advo-
cate a model which challenges
such deeply held concepts. The
human relations approach is easy
to "buy," since it does not chal-
lenge the manager's basic role or
status. It is correspondingly easy
to sell, since it promises much and
actually demands little. The hu-
man resources model, on the other
hand, promises much but also de-
mands a great deal from the man-
ager. It requires that he under-
take the responsibility of utilizing
all the resources available to him
— his own and those of his sub-
ordinates. It does not suggest that
it will make his job easier; it only
acknowledges his obligation to do
a much better job.
Logical Implications
The nature of the evidence to
uai.e does noi warrant any firm or
sweeping conclusions. Neverthe-
less, it does suggest enough sup-
port for the interpretations made
here to make it worthwhile, and
perhaps imperative, to draw some
logical implications from the fact
that managers seem to have adopt-
ed two apparently conflicting atti-
tudes regarding participative man-
agement.
The first implication, and the
easiest one to draw, is that, given
managers' present attitudes, the
hu}7ian resources model has little
chance of ever gaining real ac-
ceptance as a guide to managers'
relationships with their subordi-
nates. Managers at every level
view themselves as capable of
greater self-direction and self-con-
trol, but apparently do not attrib-
ute such abilities to their subor-
dinates. As long as managers
throughout the organizational hier-
archy remain unaware that the
kind of participation they want
and believe thrif are capable of
handling is also the kind their sub-
ordinates want and feel they de-
serve, there would seem to be little
hope for the human resources ap-
proach being actually put into
practice.
A second, and somewhat more
complex, implication of managers'
current views is that real partici-
pation will seldom be found in
modern organizations. Participa-
tion, in the human relations model,
is viewed as an "ought" rather
than a "must." The manager is
under no basic obligation to seek
out and develop talent, or to en-
courage and allow participation;
it is something which he "prob-
ably should do" but not something
for which he is made to feel truly
responsible. Viewing participation
in this fashion, the manager often
junks it when problems arise or
pressure builds up from above —
the very times when it might be
expected to produce the greatest
gains.
A third implication, closely re-
lated to the second, is that the
benefits which the human resour-
ces approach predicts from parti-
cipative management will not ac-
crue as long as managers cling
to the human relations view. From
the human relations model, a man-
ager may draw a rule for decision
making which says that he should
allow only as much participation,
self-direction, and self-control as
is required to obtain cooperation
and reduce resistance to formal
authority. In the area of job en-
largement, for example, the man-
ager following the human relatiojis
model would be tempted to enlarge
his subordinates' jobs just enough
to improve morale and satisfac-
tion, with little real concern for
making full use of their abilities.
This limited approach borders on
pseudoparticipation and may lie in-
terpreted by suboi'dinates as just
another manipulative technique.
The hnmaji resources model, on
the other hand, does not hold the
manager to so limited a decision
rule. In fact, it affirms that he is
obligated to develop and encourage
a continually expanding degree of
responsible participation, self-di-
rection, and self-control. The only
11 See Clapget C. Smith ami Arnold
Tanncnbaum, "Organizational Control
Structure: A Comparative Analysis."
Human Relations, November 19K3. PP-
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niting factor; legitimate in this
iproach are the basic requirc-
cnts of capacity to perform and
e need for coordination. The
anager following the human re-
tirees model would therefore
ntinually expand subordinates'
sponsibility and self-direction up
the limits of their abilities,
id/or to the point at which fur-
er expansion would produce a
isteful overlap among the re-
onsibilities of members of his
partment. Even these limits,
wever, are far from absolute.
ie human resources model sug-
sts that with subordinates' broad-
ed abilities and expanded infor-
ation, voluntary cooperation can
ase much of the need for spe-
ic job boundaries.
A fourth and final implication
n be drawn from managers' con-
sed and conflicting attitudes
vard participative management,
anagers' attitudes, as suggested
rlier, in part reflect the ambiva-
it and inconsistent treatment
lich scholars have given to par-
ipative leadership concepts, and
i not likely to change until the-
sts firm up their own thinking.
me Final Comments
It must be clear at this point
it I feel that management schol-
i should focus their attention on
veloping and promoting the ap-
cation of the human resources
proach. While I cannot, at this
ge, base my preference for the
, man resources model on solid
upirical evidence, there is one
iong argument for its potential
'^fulness. It is the fact that man-
ors up and down the organiza-
inal hierarchy believe their su-
]riors should follow this model.
Critics of the human resources
approach have argued that (i) its
costs outweigh its benefits because
in its final form the human resour-
ces model prescribes management
by committee at every level, which
results in wasted effort and the
inability to act in crisis situations;
and (2) this approach is unsuit-
able for organizations or organiza-
tional groups whose members have
neither the desire nor the ability
to meet its challenge.
In answer to the first charge,
this approach does imply a need
for additional information flow to
subordinates at all levels, and I ad-
mit that collecting and disseminat-
ing information increases costs.
However, information collected
and used at lower levels may be
less costly than information col-
lected for use at upper levels that
is subsequently ignored or mis-
used. Further, and more impor-
tant, the application of the human
resources model does not require
— in fact, would make unneces-
sary — committee-type sharing of
routine departmental tasks.
This model would suggest that
subordinates are generally willing
to go along with their superiors'
decisions on more or less routine
matters, particularly when they are
well informed and feel free to call
important points to their bosses'
attention. Moreover, this approach
implies that many matters are to
be delegated directly to one or




own activities. At the same time,
this model emphasizes that full
and extended discussion by the
whole department will be utilized
where it can do the most good —
on complex and important prob-
lems that demand the full talent
and complete concern of the group.
One could argue that under these
circumstances crises should arise
less often and consensus should
be more quickly reached when they
do arise.
There is no quick and easy an-
swer to the second charge that the
human resources model is more
adaptable to and more easilv ap-
plied with some groups than with
others. Note, however, that it is
the human relations approach, and
not the human resources model,
which premises quick and easy ap-
plication. The latter cannot be put
into full-blown practice overnight
in any situation, particularly where
subordinates have been condi-
tioned by years of traditional or
pseudoparticipative techniques of
leadership. It involves a step-by-
step procedure wherein the man-
ager expands subordinates' re-
sponsibilities and participation in
keeping with their developing abil-
ities and concerns. High expecta-
tions and full support, coupled
with an open recognition of the
inevitability of occasional short-
comings, are required to achieve
successful application.
Finally, there is a familiar ring
to the critics' charge that many
organization members arc either
unwilling or unable to contribute
creatively, or to accept any real
measure of responsibility. In fact,
this charge brings us back once
again to the heart of the conflict
in managers' attitudes toward par-
ticipation — their own view that
subordinates are suited only for
the human relations type of par-
ticipation, while they themselves
are well suited for the full range
of participation suggested in the
human resources model.
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2. What relations do you sen between Command Climate
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ies listed and the
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ep 1: Transcribe the dimension/index numbers and names from Figure 4 to
the appropriate spaces in Figure t^ •
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applies to the dimension/index,
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in the space provided in Figure ~j .
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a. Communications (2-4 hours)
b. Motivation (2-4 hours)
c. Decision Making (2-3 hours)
d. Power and Authority (2-4 hours)
e. Goals and Plans (6 hours - 2 days)
f. Values (1-2 hours)
g. Leadership Styles (1-2 hours)
ho Peer group/intergroup
(4 hours)
i. Mirroring Exercise (6 hours - 2 days)
j. Team Building (1-4 hours)




























HRLlC's CONFERENCE ROOM ARRANGEMENT
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PEER GROUP "WE WANTS"
GROUP I (Officers/Master and Senior Chiefs/CPO's/POl's
1« Delineation of divisional responsibility.
*2. Eliminate crisis management via integrated department
planning based on human resources and time available.
*3o Strengthen and properly use chain of command (lip
service) (respect a two way street
)
4« Tailor I Dd vision indoctrination to fit needs of
individual. -
5. Dissemination of information (POD, PDL).
6. Enforcement of taps
*7o Leave and Liberty policy.
GROUP II (P02)
1. Laundry service.
*2 e More definite PQS program (school call after dinner-OJT)
*3o Better watch bill coordination.
*4o Recognize and consult P02 o
nppTm ttt /dc\0\
*1. Proper deadline for chits*
*2o Duty Corpsman from another ship.
*3o Policy of sending messcooks.
*4e Administration not properly manned.
5<> Change to a six section watch.
6. Tropical hours over standard working hours.
7o Better recreation facilities aboardo
3. Shave inspection after knock-off.
9« Variation in crew's menu,
10. Civilian clothes on messdecks anytime.
GROUP IV (E-2/E-3)
la Restructure working parties and include restricted men.
2„ Make the AAP known to the crew.
*3a Show respect both up and down.
4a No indepth feedback from Strieker board.
*5a Improve information flow in chain of command.
6 Opportunities for school during yard period.
*7a More OJT, GMT indoctrination and training by LPO's
for newly reported personnel.
So Better introduction of newly reported personnel by I
Division.
9a Expedite special request chit - more feedback on chits,




SIX STEP PLANNING ACTION TEAMS
TEAM "A" TEAM "B" TEAM "C" TEAM "D"
SHI BTCS LTJG LTJG
HT1 SD1 MMCM MM1
OS 2 OS 2 GMG1 RM2
STG2 GMM2 FTM2 MM2
FTM2 STG3 SH3 CSC
FTM3 MM3 MM2 OS 3
BT3 SN ICFN ETNSN
HTFN RMSA SA SA
SMSN
FACILITATORS
TEAM "A" CPO TEVIS
"B" CWO HARRIS/BT1 GRAHAM
"C" MCPO JUNTON
"D" SCPO JACOBY
HRMC ZULU TEAM LEADER
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